
Todd Landman

I. INTRODUCTION

The final decades of the 20th Century in Latin America saw a large number of economic, political and legal changes. Countries in the region saw a general economic transformation from a Keynesian state-led model of development to a more neo-liberal model, which has been largely driven by external forces related to the region’s extraction from the debt crisis through the imposition of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Brohman 1996). Complementing this shift from state-led to market-led economic development, many countries in the region experienced transitions from authoritarian rule. Starting with the Peruvian transition in 1978 and ending with the Mexican transition in 2000, a wave of democratisation has spread across the region such that Latin America has joined the ‘democratic universe’ even though the experience has been punctuated by democratic setbacks in Fujimoro’s Peru, Chavez’s Venezuela, and to a lesser extent Menem’s Argentina and Cardoso’s Brazil (Foweraker, Landman and Harvey 2003). Alongside these economic and political changes, the region has also emerged as a key terrain for the human rights movement. Through the promulgation of new constitutions (or the resurrection of old ones) and through ratification of international and regional human rights instruments, countries in the region have made new and extensive commitments to the de jure protection of human rights. On the ground, however, civil society organisations and human rights NGOs have monitored the de facto protection of human rights throughout the periods of authoritarian rule and democratic transition. Persistent patterns of human rights abuse despite the advance of democratic political institutions and state commitment to the international law of human rights have mobilised domestic and international civil society to struggle for improvement in the human rights situation through greater enforcement and implementation of human rights norms.

These developments have led to a raised set of expectations for the region about the inter-relationships between and among development, democracy
and human rights. Yet, there is still a paucity of empirical analysis supporting such claims at the regional level. Using comparative data from 17 Latin American countries for the period 1976–2000 (total \( N = 425 \)), this chapter examines descriptively the cross-national and temporal patterns in development, democracy and human rights and then uses correlation and regression analysis to examine the empirical relationships between and among the various indicators. The descriptive analysis on development shows that while the region experienced a general increase in trade liberalization, it also experienced a real decrease in per capita GDP during the 1980s, and has had residual problems with high concentrations of income, high levels of undernourishment, and middling levels of human development. The descriptive data on democracy and human rights shows that the region has made great strides in strengthening democratic institutions and that any real improvements in curbing human rights violations have not been made until the mid-1990s, where Brazil and Peru stand out as significant outliers in the region with respect to the prevalence of torture. Such persistent gaps between the development of democratic institutions and real protection of human rights supports the notion that Latin America suffers from the presence of ‘illiberal democracy’ (Zakaria 2003).

The bivariate and multivariate statistical analysis shows that there is a weak and in many cases insignificant relationship between income levels and democracy, which confirms similar findings on the ‘exceptional’ nature of the region with respect to the tenets of modernization theory (see also Landman 1999; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñan 2003). But the statistical analysis does show that there are significant positive effects for democracy, wealth, interdependence, and membership in international and regional human rights regimes for the protection of different sets of human rights. These results are obtained even after controlling for past human rights practices, sub-regional variation, population size, and involvement in civil war. Taken together, the comparative and statistical analysis presented here shows the mixed fortunes of the region during the final two and a half decades of the 20th Century, and the chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications of the findings for assessing the future prospects for development, democracy and human rights in Latin America.

II. DESCRIPTIVE PATTERNS

Using comparable quantitative indicators, this section of the chapter maps the temporal and spatial patterns of development, democracy and human rights across 17 Latin America countries for the period 1976–2000. The countries used throughout this section and the next include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Focus on South America

Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.

II.1. Development

Broadly speaking, Latin American countries shifted from a state-led to a market-led model of economic development during the years examined in this chapter. Import substitution industrialization had given way to export-led growth, a shift that was largely brought on by the debt crisis in the 1980s and the imposition of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) implemented by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The basic elements of such programmes include trade liberalization (removal of tariffs, quotas and other barriers to trade), currency devaluation, removal of price and wage controls, and downsizing or elimination of state-owned enterprises (see Brohman 1996: 132–172; Todaro 1997: 458–532; Drazen 2000: 615–74). Based on a neo-classical counter-revolution or neo-liberal ideology, these programmes were meant to liberate countries in the region from bloated and inefficient state-dominated economies and promote rapid growth with (eventual) equity. The programmes were designed to provide immediate stabilization for hyperinflation and a long-term re-allocation of resources to make the economy more efficient and productive. Using different indicators of development, it is possible to map the degree to which these policies were successful in delivering prosperity to the region. While this is far from presenting a fully specified econometric model of growth and development, the descriptive analysis gives some indication of the patterns in socio-economic change throughout the period.

The development indicators include measures of income (per capita GDP), trade openness (trade as a percentage of GDP), income distribution (Gini coefficient), human development (UNDP human development index, HDI), and food security (percentage of the population facing undernourishment). Figure 13.1 plots the time-series trends in per capita GDP and trade as a percentage of GDP. The figure shows that the years immediately following the introduction of structural adjustment programmes in the region experienced a contraction in trade between 1979 and 1987, followed by an expansion until 1998 when it again contracted. Per capita GDP followed a similar trend in that it decreased for most of the 1980s and started to show monotonic growth in the 1990s to reach a regional average of just over $3000 (1995 US dollars). Despite the similarity in trends, trade and GDP are significantly negatively correlated, suggesting that the promises of trade liberalisation have not had the expected relationship with changes in per capita GDP.

Figure 13.2 shows the cross-national averages for Gini co-efficient during the period. It is clear from the figure that despite the overall increase in

Figure 13.1 Trade and income in Latin America, 1976–2000

Source: World Development Indicators (www.worldbank.org)

Figure 13.2 Income distribution in Latin America, various years
Focus on South America

Figure 13.3 Human development in Latin America, 1975–1999


Figure 13.4 Prevalence of undernourishment in Latin America, various years

Source: FAO (2000: 27–30)
average per capita GDP for the whole period, there are many countries in the region where the gains from any developmental advance have not been distributed in the fairest fashion. Countries with the highest maldistribution of income include Brazil, Guatemala and Paraguay with an average Gini coefficient of approximately 59 per cent. Of these countries with the worst distribution of income, Brazil has the highest average per capita GDP at $4155 (1995 USD), making it the third richest country in the region behind Uruguay and Argentina. Figure 13.3 shows the average human development index scores, which depict the combined achievements across per capita GDP, adult literacy and enrolment in education, and life expectancy at birth (UNDP 2002: 252). The top economies in the region perform reasonably well on this measure, followed by the Andean and Central American countries. Over the period the average HDI grew from 0.64 to 0.74. Finally, Figure 13.4 shows the percentage of the population facing problems of undernourishment in which it is clear severe problems have afflicted Honduras in the late 1970s, Peru between 1990 and 1992, and Nicaragua throughout the period.

Taken together, the indicators on development demonstrate mixed results for the period, with economic stagnation in the 1980s, reasonable improvements in human development, the persistence of income maldistribution, and the continued prevalence of undernourishment.

II.2. Democracy

For the initial years under comparison in this study, many countries in the region were either under authoritarian rule (for example Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador Peru, Paraguay and Uruguay), involved in violent civil conflicts (for example El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua), or in the case of Mexico, were under one-party dominant rule. The region had had past experiences of democracy in many of these countries during the so-called populist period of the 1940s and 1950s (Hartlyn and Valenzuela 1994: 135–43), but with the Peruvian transition to democracy in 1978, a general wave of democratisation spread throughout the region with democratic transitions in Ecuador (1979), Honduras (1980), Bolivia (1982), Argentina (1983), Uruguay (1984), El Salvador (1984), Brazil (1985), Guatemala (1985), Chile (1988), Panama (1989), Paraguay (1989), Nicaragua (1990), and Mexico (2000) (see Foweraker, Landman and Harvey 2003: 41).

Figure 13.5 shows the democracy, autocracy and combined democracy–autocracy scores from the Polity IV data set for the region from 1816 to 1998, while Figure 13.6 shows the same scores for the period 1976–1998. The longer time-series plot of these indicators shows a general rise in the democracy score between 1816 and 1900 during which the region gains its independence and promulgates a series of limited liberal constitutions largely
modelled after the US constitution. The early tumultuous years of the 20th Century give way to a slightly greater democratic improvement through the 1940s and 1950s, a collapse of democracy and the rise of authoritarianism throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, and finally the return to democracy during the ‘third wave’ of democratisation (Huntington 1991). Figure 13.6 captures the contours of the third wave in Latin America, and with the Chilean and Brazilian democratic elections in 1989, all the countries in the region with the exception of Cuba had elected constitutional governments.

II.3. Human rights

This final sub-section of the chapter examines comparative indicators of de jure and de facto protection of certain human rights. The former kind of protection refers to those human rights that states formally commit themselves to protecting through ratification of international and regional human rights instruments. The latter kind of protection refers to the degree to which such rights are actually protected within the domestic jurisdiction of the state. Measures of the de jure protection of human rights reward countries for ratification of the main international and regional human rights instruments (see below). The indicators
used here give a country a 0 for no signature, a 1 for signature, and a 2 for ratification (see Landman 2005). Measures of de facto protection of human rights reward countries for the absence of systematic abuse of human rights as reported through local and international sources that monitor human rights practices of states. The measures used here focus on the protection of political and civil rights. They include the Amnesty International and US State Department version of the Political Terror Scale (see Poe and Tate 1994), the two separate scales of civil and political liberties produced by Freedom House (see www.freedomhouse.org), and a scale of torture, which relies on source material from the US State Department (see Hathaway 2002). All the scales give larger points to those countries with a more systematic pattern of human rights abuse. The Political Terror Scale and torture scale range from 1 to 5, while Freedom House ranges from 1 to 7. For ease of comparability used in the descriptive analysis, all the scales have been transformed to range from 0 to 1, while the statistical analysis uses the scales in their original form.

De jure protection
Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, there have been a series of international instruments established for the protection of human
Focus on South America

rights, including most notably the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the 1966 International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the 1984 Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), and the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (see Gandhi 2002: 55–132). Complementing the development of these human rights instruments at the international level, the inter-American system has also developed a series of regional human rights instruments for the protection of human rights, including the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), the 1985 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (IACPPT), the 1988 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (IAPESCR), the 1990 Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty (IAPADP), the 1994 Inter-American Convention on the Forced

![Graph](image_url)

*Source:* Landman (2005)

*Figure 13.7* Latin American state ratification of international human rights instruments
Disappearances of Persons (IACFDP), and the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women (IACPPEVAW) (see Gandhi 2002: 330–65).

Figures 13.7 and 13.8 show the time-series trends in state ratification of the international and regional instruments for the protection of human rights in Latin American countries for the 1976–2000 period. At the international level, Latin American countries have increasingly committed themselves to the growing body of human rights norms and in that sense participate actively in the international community in this issue area. After the European system, the inter-American system for the promotion and protection of human rights is the second most powerful region system and has a number of unique features such as the ability for the Inter-American Commission to carry out in situ visits. Comparing the two figures on ratification shows, however, that the countries in the region ratify more of the international instruments than the regional instruments. There is thus significant scope for the expansion of state participation in the regional system.


Figure 13.8 Latin American state ratification of inter-American human rights instruments

Disappearances of Persons (IACFDP), and the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women (IACPPEVAW) (see Gandhi 2002: 330–65).

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De facto protection

Despite the growth in the breadth and depth of the international and regional systems for the promotion and protection of human rights, the record of de facto human rights protection in the region has been notably negative during the period of authoritarian rule in the Southern Cone and during the period of prolonged civil conflicts in Central America. In addition, the prolonged and complex conflict in Colombia has led to persistent abuses of human rights, including violence against members of the judiciary and human rights defenders. Figure 13.9 shows the time-series trends in human rights violations for the different measures, where the Freedom House scores shows a general level of improvement over time, the Political Terror Scale shows a convergence between the two versions and a slight improvement, and the torture scale shows a peak in 1990 with an otherwise relatively high score throughout the period in which it is available (1985–1999). But Figure 13.9 masks the sub-regional variation in the scores by country. Thus, Figures 13.10, 13.11, and 13.12 show the country differences across these different measures, where the ‘between group’ differences in means are all statistically significant (F > 2.0, p < 0.01).

Source: Landman (2005)

Figure 13.9 De facto human rights protection in Latin America, 1976–2000
Development, democracy and human rights in Latin America

Figure 13.10 Political terror in Latin America, 1976–2000

The sub-regional comparison of political terror (Figure 13.10) shows unsurprisingly that Colombia, Guatemala and Peru have had the most persistent problem with violations of personal integrity rights, which include political imprisonment, arbitrary detention, extra-judicial killing and exile. The armed conflicts in all these cases have led to significant state-led terror against ordinary citizens. The Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH) in Guatemala estimated that 132,000 people had been killed in the conflict during the 1970s and 1980s (CEH 1999: 72), where the state was responsible for 95 per cent of the killings (Ball 2000: 278). The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR) in Peru estimated that 70,000 people died in the 20-year conflict between the government and the Sendero Luminoso guerrilla movement (1980–2000), where the state was responsible for 30 per cent of the killings (Ball, Asher, Sulmont and Manrique 2003: 2). Full estimates of the total number of extra-judicial killings in Colombia vary, but Human Rights Watch (www.hrw.org) and the US State Department (www.state.gov) report that state responsibility for such killings has declined over the 1990s. The second highest-ranking cases in Figure 13.10 include Brazil, El Salvador and Nicaragua. In contrast, the Freedom House scores produce a different picture, where Chile, Nicaragua and Paraguay appear to have the worst records of political and civil rights protection, while Colombia has the largest gap...
Focus on South America

Figure 13.11  Civil and Political Rights in Latin America, 1976–2000

Source: www.freedomhouse.org

Figure 13.12  Torture in Latin America, 1985–1999

Source: Hathaway (2002)
between political rights and civil rights protection. These differences between
the two figures are explained by the institutional dimensions included in the
Freedom House scales that reward countries for holding elections and having
democratic institutions in place (for example Colombia), as well as the pres-
ence of some ideological bias, which has led to a more unfavourable portrayal
of certain regimes (for example Nicaragua) (see Munck 2002; Landman and
Häusermann 2003). Finally, the comparison of torture shows that Brazil and
Peru are significant outliers in the region with very high levels of persistent
uses of torture. Thus, like the patterns of development outlined in Section
II.1, the region has seen a mixed record for the promotion and protection of
human rights.

III. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

This section of the chapter pushes the analysis beyond mere description to
examine the important first and second order relationships between and among
the variables measuring development, democracy and human rights. The
section proceeds by enumerating the variables that will be used for the
analysis, showing the bivariate correlation coefficients between these vari-
ables, and exploring possible explanations for democratisation and the
protection of human rights.

III.1. Variables

Extant research in comparative politics on modernization theory (e.g. Lipset
1959; Helliwell 1994; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Landman 1999;
Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi 2000; Mainwaring and Pérez-
Lizan 2003, Foweraker and Landman 2004) and in international relations on
human rights and the democratic peace (for example Poe and Tate 1994; Poe,
Tate and Keith, 1999; Keith 1999; Russett and O’Neal 2001; Hathaway 2002;
Landman 2005) has identified important variables for exploring empirical
relationships between and among development, democracy and human rights.
In addition to variables on development, democracy and human rights out-
lined in the descriptive section of this chapter, this section uses a series of
other important international and domestic variables, including state mem-
bership in international governmental organisations (IGOs), the number of
registered international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), population
size, and the Correlates of War (COW) measure of civil war. IGO and INGO
membership are two variables drawn from neo-liberal-institutionalist research
tradition in international relations (for example Russet and O’Neal 2001).
Population size and civil war are standard variables used in global analysis of
Table 13.1 Variables used in the statistical analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td><strong>Development</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNPCGDP (Natural log of per capita GDP)</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>6.01</td>
<td>9.04</td>
<td>7.72</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNTRADE (Natural log of trade as a % of GDP)</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>4.78</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democracy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMOC4 (Polity IV democracy–autocracy)</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>-9.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>6.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Human Rights</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACHR (American Convention on Human Rights)</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights)</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTSAI (Political Terror Scale – Amnesty)</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>1.11</td>
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<td>PTSSD (Political Terror Scale – State Department)</td>
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<td>1.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>1.02</td>
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<tr>
<td>FHCRIGHT (Freedom House Civil Rights)</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FHPRIGHT (Freedom House Political Rights)</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>1.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TORTURE (Torture Scale)</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNINGOS (Natural log of domestic NGOs)</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>7.63</td>
<td>5.71</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGOMEM (Membership of IGOs)</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>9.83</td>
<td>94.00</td>
<td>55.38</td>
<td>17.67</td>
</tr>
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<td>LNPOP (Natural log of population)</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>14.39</td>
<td>18.95</td>
<td>16.16</td>
<td>1.18</td>
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<tr>
<td>CWARCOW (Correlates of War Civil War)</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CADUM (Central America dummy)</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCDUM (Southern Cone Dummy)</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
human rights protection (for example Poe and Tate 1994). The analysis also uses dummy variables for Central America and the Southern Cone to control for sub-regional variation (see Landman 1999: 617–18). The analysis limits itself to consideration of the ICCPR and ACHR from international human rights law. Table 13.1 lists all the variables used in the subsequent analysis, a brief description of each, and basic summary statistics.

### III.2. First-order Relationships

Table 13.2 is a bivariate correlation matrix, which explores possible relationships between and among the variables and represents a first step in the statistical analysis that moves beyond pure description. Sections of the table have been shaded and boxed for ease of the substantive discussion about some of the results that have been obtained.

The shaded region in the first row shows that there is an association between higher levels of per capita GDP and lower levels of human rights violations for four out of the five measures. The measures variously cover the period 1976–2000, while the torture measure has the least coverage from 1985 to 1999. Such an association lends some support to the expectations of modernization theory (for example Lipset 1959; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Landman 1999) and confirms findings from global comparisons on human rights (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994); however, the absence of an association between wealth and the level of torture is driven by the fact that torture increased during the early 1990s (see Figure 13.9) and has been high among significant outliers such as Brazil and Peru (see Figure 13.12). It is also important to note the absence of a significant correlation between per capita GDP and democracy, a point that is explored further in section III.3.

The shaded region in the third row of Table 13.2 shows on the one hand, a positive and significant relationship between democracy and ratification of both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the American Convention on the Rights and Duties of Man, while on the other hand, it shows a negative and significant relationship between democracy and human rights violations. In other words, democracies have a greater tendency to ratify human rights treaties as well as a better record at protecting the various human rights represented by the different measures. Such a tendency among ‘new’ democracies to ratify human rights treaties is consistent with liberal republican theory in international relations, which argues that new democracies seek out international commitments to ‘lock in’ future generations of politicians in an effort to protect their nascent democratic institutions (see Moravcsik 1997, 2000; Landman 2005). This theory and its empirical confirmation were developed in relation to the European Convention for Human
Table 13.2  Bivariate correlation matrix for all variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Development</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
<th>Human Rights</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>LNPGDP</td>
<td>-0.48***</td>
<td>-0.21***</td>
<td>0.21***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>LNTRADE</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.11***</td>
<td>0.39***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>DEMOC4</td>
<td>0.15**</td>
<td>-0.25***</td>
<td>-0.30***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>ACHR</td>
<td>0.15**</td>
<td>-0.25***</td>
<td>-0.19***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>ICCPR</td>
<td>0.14**</td>
<td>-0.25***</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>PTSSAI</td>
<td>0.28***</td>
<td>-0.23***</td>
<td>-0.31***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>PTSSD</td>
<td>0.22***</td>
<td>-0.16**</td>
<td>-0.11**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>FHCR</td>
<td>0.20***</td>
<td>-0.20***</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>FHPR</td>
<td>0.20***</td>
<td>-0.27***</td>
<td>-0.25***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>TORTURE</td>
<td>0.24***</td>
<td>-0.25***</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>LNINGOS</td>
<td>0.26***</td>
<td>-0.15**</td>
<td>-0.10**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>IGOS</td>
<td>0.26***</td>
<td>-0.37***</td>
<td>-0.28***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>LNPPOP</td>
<td>0.26***</td>
<td>-0.52***</td>
<td>-0.46***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>CWAR</td>
<td>0.26***</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 237 ≤ N ≤ 425; Pearson’s r, *p<.01, **p<.05, ***p<.001
Rights and it appears that such a finding receives additional support at the regional level of Latin America. The tendency for democracies to be better at protecting human rights is consistent with empirical democratic theory, which sees a certain affinity between democracy and human rights (see, for example, Beetham 1999), and empirical analysis that demonstrates democracy’s ability to protect human rights (for example Poe and Tate 1994; Zanger 2000). Yet the association is not perfect unity, suggesting that there remains a gap between procedural democracy and liberal democracy (Diamond 1999; Foweraker and Krznaric 2000; Foweraker and Landman 2002, 2004).

The boxed area in rows four and five of Table 13.2 shows negative and significant relationships between ratification of the ICCPR and ACHR and the various measures of human rights, suggesting that those countries with a better ratification record also tend to be better at protecting human rights. This finding at the regional level of Latin America confirms a general global finding for the bivariate relationship between human rights treaty ratification and human rights protection (see Keith 1999; Hathaway 2002; Landman 2005). This relationship between the international law of human rights and human rights protection in Latin America is explored further through multivariate analysis in Section III.3.

The shaded region for rows six to nine in Table 13.2 shows that the various human rights measures are highly (but not perfectly) correlated with one another, a result that is evident in the time-series plot of the measures for the region (see Figure 13.9). The boxed region in the column for international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) shows that a greater presence of INGOs is associated with a lower violation of human rights across four out of the five measures. Again, the practice of torture is an exception. Finally, the shaded region in the column for Civil War shows that human rights violations are higher in those countries that have experienced periods of civil war, and such countries have a smaller participation in international governmental organisations (IGOs).

Taken together, the first-order correlation analysis highlights a number of important empirical relationships between and among development, democracy and human rights. Relatively wealthy, democratic countries, with a greater presence of INGO participation in the ICCPR and ACHR, and no prolonged involvement in civil war have a greater tendency for lower levels of human rights violations. But these findings are achieved in isolation from one another and are merely statistical associations that require a more sophisticated multivariate model specification that takes into account the temporal and spatial characteristics of the data employed here.
III.3. Second-order Relationships

Development and democracy

The main tenets of modernization theory assert that democracy ought to be the natural product of economic development. This assertion has normally been tested through cross-national (for example Lipset 1959) and cross-national time-series global analysis (for example Helliwell 1994; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi 2000), the results of which confirm that there is a positive and significant relationship between economic development and democracy (see Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992; Landman 2003). Some scholars have used this empirical generalization to claim that economic development is associated with democracy (Lipset 1959) or causes democracy (for example Helliwell 1994; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994), while others concede that the empirical results are obtained from the fact that rich democracies tend not to collapse (Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi 2000). Replication of the analysis at the regional level has shown that these global findings cannot be upheld within Latin America, whether tested for the period 1972–1995 (see Landman 1999) or for the period 1945–1990 (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñan 2003).

The absence of any relationship between economic development and democracy can be shown using the relevant variables from Table 13.1:

\[
\text{Democracy} = 0.93(\text{Democracy}_{t-1}) + 0.01(\text{Wealth}) - 0.09(\text{Central America}) + 0.50(\text{Southern Cone})
\]

\[
(0.019)*** (0.20) (0.29) (0.17)
\]

Using cross-sectional time-series regression techniques, the equation above shows the parameter estimates for a simple modernization model that includes past values of democracy, economic development, and the two sub-regional dummy variables. The inclusion of a lagged version of the dependent variable (democracy) controls for time-serial autocorrelation, while the inclusion of the sub-regional dummy variables controls for significant variation in development and democracy in Central America and the Southern Cone during the period (see also Landman 1999). The reported parameter estimates include the unstandardised regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. The only significant variable is the past democracy variable, which is a typical result of such model specifications (see for example Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Helliwell 1994; Landman 1999). In substantive terms, it appears that the much-heralded association between development and democracy fails to be upheld in Latin America. To date, the region lacks an endogenous theory of democratisation (see
Boix 2003; Boix and Stokes 2003) and stands as an important example of ‘regional exceptionalism’ with regard to the modernization perspective (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñan 2003).

Development, democracy and human rights
Drawing (somewhat unwittingly) on the insights of modernization theory, the international human rights community has continued to make a variety of assertions concerning not only the indivisibility of human rights but also the relationships between and among development, democracy and human rights. The best example of such an assertion comes from Paragraph 8 of the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, which states, ‘Democracy, development, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are interdependent and mutually reinforcing’ (see for example Ghandhi 2002: 418). The Vienna Declaration is not a legally binding human rights instrument, but the result of discussions among 171 states at a United Nations World Conference on human rights instruments, and as such represents a consensus agreement among the participating states (see Boyle 1995: 81) that is a declaration rather than an empirical generalization. Boyle (1995: 81) rightly contends that social scientists ‘have difficulty in relating to the normative language of documents such as the Vienna Declaration’, but in many ways, the declaration has been transformed into an empirical generalization through its frequent repetition in international policy circles, and has led to raised expectations within developing countries.

As outlined briefly above, global comparative analysis has shown strong empirical support for the relationship between economic development and democracy (for example Lipset 1959; Helliwell 1994; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994), between economic development and democratic performance (Foweraker and Landman 2004), between economic development and the protection of human rights (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith 1999), between democracy and human rights (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith 1999; Zanger 2000; Landman 2005) and between international human rights law and human rights (Keith 1999; Hathaway 2002; Landman 2005). With the exception of Helliwell (1994: 5–6), Foweraker and Landman (2004), and Landman (2005), such global analyses do not include dummy variables to control for regional variation. For example, Helliwell (1994: 5–6) shows that after controlling for different levels of per capita GDP, the level of democracy is higher in OECD countries, lower in six oil-dependent countries of the Middle East, lower in Africa, and higher in Latin America where the base of comparator countries are mostly in Eastern Europe and Asia. In their analysis of democratic performance, Foweraker and Landman (2004: 9–14) show that after controlling for levels of per capita GDP, Latin American countries perform worse on the performance dimen-
Focus on South America

sions of executive constraint, legislative votes, competitiveness of participation, and the protection of civil rights. The apparent discrepancy between these two studies is explained by the fact that Foweraker and Landman (2004) use a disaggregated measure of democratic performance across eight different democratic values. But both studies are conscious of the need to control for regional variation and invite further analysis of global empirical generalizations at the regional level. Equally, Landman (2005) includes regional dummies in his analysis of the relationship between the international law of human rights and human rights protection.

Thus, the global expectations and generalizations produced either through consensual declarations such as the one issued in Vienna or through extant empirical analysis should be tested at the regional level, especially since policy advice and recommendations flow from such declarations and global analyses and then are applied to sets of developing countries or to specific geographic regions. To that end, this section of the chapter tests a series of models on human rights protection in Latin America using the development, democracy and other variables outlined above. The analysis specifies a general model of human rights protection that takes the following form:

\[
\text{Human rights protection}_t = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Human rights protection}_{t-1} + \beta_2 \text{Human rights instrument ratification}_t + \beta_3 \text{Democracy}_t + \beta_4 \text{Economic development}_t + \beta_5 \text{IGO membership}_t + \beta_6 \text{INGO membership}_t + \beta_7 \text{Trade}_t + \beta_8 \text{Civil war}_t + \beta_9 \text{Population size}_t + \beta_{10} \text{Central America}_t + \beta_{11} \text{Southern Cone}_t + \epsilon_t
\]

Where human rights protection is represented by the five violations measures, human rights instrument ratification refers to the ICCPR and ACHR ratifications, democracy is the Polity IV democracy–autocracy variable, economic development is the natural log of per capita GDP, IGO membership is the number of IGOs to which a country is a party, INGO membership is the number of INGOs registered in the country, trade is the natural log of total trade as percentage of GDP, civil war is a dummy variable, population size is the natural log of the yearly population, and the Central America and the Southern Cone are dummy variables. In addition, \(\alpha\) and \(\beta_1\) to \(\beta_{11}\) are the parameters to be estimated and \(\epsilon\) is the error term. Since there are five different human rights measures and two different treaty ratification variables, a total of ten regressions were carried out to estimate the parameters, the results of which are reported in Tables 13.3 (for the ICCPR) and 13.4 (for the ACHR).

The results reported in Tables 13.3 and 13.4 reveal a series of important findings regarding the empirical relationships among development, demo-
## Table 13.3 Parameter estimates for human rights protection in Latin America, 1976–2000 (using the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>PTS (Amnesty)</th>
<th>PTS (State Dept.)</th>
<th>Freedom House CR</th>
<th>Freedom House PR</th>
<th>Torture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.70 (1.47)</td>
<td>1.22 (1.23)</td>
<td>2.30* (1.24)</td>
<td>1.39 (1.47)</td>
<td>–3.08* (1.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged human rights</td>
<td>.61*** (.04)</td>
<td>.53*** (.04)</td>
<td>.80*** (.03)</td>
<td>.84*** (.03)</td>
<td>.34*** (.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICCPR</td>
<td>–.05 (.06)</td>
<td>.07 (0.05)</td>
<td>–.07* (0.05)</td>
<td>–.08 (0.06)</td>
<td>–.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>–.02*** (.01)</td>
<td>–.04*** (.07)</td>
<td>– (0.01)</td>
<td>– (0.01)</td>
<td>–.05*** (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>–.10 (.07)</td>
<td>–.24*** (.07)</td>
<td>–.12* (0.06)</td>
<td>–.07 (0.07)</td>
<td>–.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGOs</td>
<td>–.004* (.002)</td>
<td>–.01*** (.002)</td>
<td>–.002 (.002)</td>
<td>–.002 (.002)</td>
<td>–.007** (.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGOs</td>
<td>–.03 (.03)</td>
<td>–.003 (.02)</td>
<td>–.05*** (.02)</td>
<td>–.04 (.03)</td>
<td>.13**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>–.15 (.13)</td>
<td>–.12 (.11)</td>
<td>–.09 (.87)</td>
<td>–.05 (.13)</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil war</td>
<td>.48*** (.12)</td>
<td>.61*** (.10)</td>
<td>.16* (.72)</td>
<td>.19* (.11)</td>
<td>.58***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>.09 (.06)</td>
<td>.18*** (.05)</td>
<td>.007 (.05)</td>
<td>.008 (.06)</td>
<td>.35***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America</td>
<td>–.12 (.12)</td>
<td>–.01 (.11)</td>
<td>–.05 (.10)</td>
<td>.001 (.13)</td>
<td>–.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Cone</td>
<td>–.03 (.13)</td>
<td>.02 (.11)</td>
<td>.04 (.11)</td>
<td>.15 (.14)</td>
<td>–.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>324</th>
<th>334</th>
<th>364</th>
<th>375</th>
<th>208</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald Chi²</td>
<td>696.32***</td>
<td>891.01***</td>
<td>1261.00***</td>
<td>1524.88***</td>
<td>334.07***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- Unstandardised coefficients are reported, standard errors in parentheses, *p<.10, **p<.01, ***p<.001
- † Since the lagged values of the two Freedom House scores are highly correlated with the democracy measure (–.68 and –.80 respectively, p< .001), the Freedom House equations exclude democracy.
Table 13.4  Parameter estimates for human rights protection in Latin America, 1976–2000 (using the American Convention on the Rights and Duties of Man)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>PTS (Amnesty)</th>
<th>PTS (State Dept.)</th>
<th>Freedom House CR†</th>
<th>Freedom House PR†</th>
<th>Torture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.75*</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>3.62**</td>
<td>2.81*</td>
<td>-3.29*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.52)</td>
<td>(1.30)</td>
<td>(1.29)</td>
<td>(1.50)</td>
<td>(1.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged human rights</td>
<td>- .58***</td>
<td>.52***</td>
<td>.77***</td>
<td>.81***</td>
<td>.36***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACHR</td>
<td>- .21**</td>
<td>- .15*</td>
<td>- .23***</td>
<td>- .31**</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>- .02**</td>
<td>- .03***</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>- .05***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.008)</td>
<td>(.007)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>- .12*</td>
<td>- .22***</td>
<td>- .15**</td>
<td>- .10</td>
<td>- .05***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGOs</td>
<td>- .005**</td>
<td>- .01***</td>
<td>- .01***</td>
<td>- .003</td>
<td>- .006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGOs</td>
<td>- .04</td>
<td>- .02</td>
<td>- .02</td>
<td>- .05*</td>
<td>.14**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>- .19</td>
<td>- .09</td>
<td>- .25**</td>
<td>- .08</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil war</td>
<td>.52***</td>
<td>.66***</td>
<td>.30***</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.50***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.09)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.16***</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>- .02</td>
<td>.35***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America</td>
<td>- .14</td>
<td>- .05</td>
<td>- .08</td>
<td>- .003</td>
<td>- .03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Cone</td>
<td>- .14</td>
<td>- .05</td>
<td>- .12</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>- .16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.14)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.14)</td>
<td>(.16)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 324 334 329 375 208
R² 0.69 0.74 0.83 0.81 0.62
Wald Chi² 708.33*** 896.91*** 1518.05*** 1566.11*** 328.15***

Notes:
Unstandardised coefficients are reported, standard errors in parentheses, *p<.10, **p<.01, ***p<.001
† Since the lagged values of the two Freedom House scores are highly correlated with the democracy measure (−.68 and −.80 respectively, p< .001), the Freedom House equations exclude democracy.
racy and human rights. First, for both sets of equations, the lagged dependent variables are all statistically significant, suggesting that human rights practices trend significantly over time, a finding that is consistent with global analyses. Second, there are significant effects for democracy on human rights protection across all the measures such that countries with higher levels of democracy tend to have lower levels of human rights violations. Again, such a finding is consistent with extant global analyses. Third, country participation in the American Convention rather than the ICCPR has a significant impact on human rights protection, even after controlling for democracy, economic development and other variables. Such a finding challenges in part global analyses on international human rights law and human rights protection (Keith 1999, Hathaway 2002), and demonstrates the importance of regional mechanisms for the protection of human rights. Fourth, the level of economic development has weak or non-existent effects on human rights protection, suggesting that the developmental experience in Latin America has not served to enhance the protection of human rights. Such a finding is inconsistent with the extant global studies and the modernization perspective, but is consistent with extant studies on development and democracy in the region (Landman 1999; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñan 2003). Fifth, involvement in civil war has a significant and consistent effect on increased levels of human rights violations, a finding that is consistent with extant global studies. IGO and NGO membership have weak and mixed effects on human rights protection, while trade has no significant impact on rights protection, with the exception of the Freedom House civil rights measure. There are thus no real effects for international interdependence or trade liberalization. Finally, there does not appear to be significant sub-regional variation in human rights protection during the period for Central America and the Southern Cone.

Taken together, the results of the multivariate statistical analyses confirm many findings at the global level and challenge significantly other such findings. The analysis confirms the importance of conflict resolution, democratisation, and greater participation in regional human rights mechanisms for the protection of human rights. As in the global studies, involvement in civil war remains the largest predictor of human rights violations, while the tangible benefits of democratisation are apparent from the consistent positive relationship between democracy and human rights. The largest regional exception is the relative dearth of evidence for the impact of economic development on either the level of democracy or the protection of human rights. It is true that the 1980s represented a ‘lost decade’ for the region with negative growth rates, high levels of foreign debt, and high rates of inflation. Yet the region has experienced a wave of democratic transitions and the gradual (if not lagged) improvement in human rights protection.
IV. CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has used the Latin American region as a natural laboratory for comparative analysis that applies the theories and methods of mainstream political science to explore important empirical puzzles. In this way, the region can serve as a regional crucial case study that employs the ‘most similar systems design’ (MSSD) in an effort to test a series of empirical theories on development, democracy and human rights (see Landman 2003).

The descriptive part of the chapter mapped the main contours of development, democracy and human rights in the region for the period under consideration. It showed that despite trade liberalization, there has been weak economic performance across the region, with persistent problems with food insecurity and income maldistribution. It showed that political transformations during the period have placed Latin America squarely in the ‘third wave’ of democratisation as it has indeed joined the ‘democratic universe’ (Foweraker, Landman and Harvey 2003: 34). It also showed that Latin America has been an active participant in the international and regional systems for the protection of human rights, and that the region itself has made some improvements in the areas of civil and political rights protection, although with persistent problems with torture, particularly in the cases of Brazil and Peru.

The statistical analysis showed that whatever economic development has taken place across the region has not been ‘automatically’ converted into either democratic or rights advance. Rather, advances in democratisation and rights protection are in need of a political explanation that moves beyond the identification of socio-economic and macro-structural variables. The democratic transitions in Latin America may rest on an endogenous explanation of political choice among elites combined with social mobilisation from below, which addressed its concerns through the increasing use of the language of rights. Comparative analysis of Brazil, Mexico and Spain on the relationship between the protection of citizenship rights and social mobilization shows the varying degree to which social mobilization can achieve greater rights protection and can contribute to democratic transitions (Foweraker and Landman 1997).

Case studies of Argentina (Brysk 1994), Chile (Ropp and Sikkink 1999; Hawkins 2002), and Guatemala (Ropp and Sikkink 1999) examine the degree to which the combined mobilization of domestic and international advocacy networks have been able to change state behaviour with respect to the protection of human rights. Domestic concerns over maintaining government legitimacy provide an opportunity for advocacy networks to put pressure on authoritarian governments to make ‘tactical concessions’ (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999), which may eventually lead to fully institutionalised human
rights protection, which has arguably been achieved in the case of Chile (see Ropp and Sikkink 1999; Hawkins 2002).

The (somewhat false) expectations of the automatic association between and among development, democracy and human rights can undermine otherwise courageous attempts to bring about democratic transition and improvement in human rights protection. While it is certainly true that increased levels of economic development support democracy (for example Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi 2000) and underpin the delivery of human rights protection, the raw pursuit of economic gain in the hope that it will necessarily deliver such political and legal improvements is based upon a false premise that ignores the truly political nature of democracy and human rights.

NOTE

1. For this correlation the natural log of both indicators are used to prevent skewness owing to sub-regional differences. Pearson’s $r = -0.48$ (p < 0.001).

REFERENCES


