abstracts for workshop papers

emotions others and the self
international conference

http://www.abo.fi/eos

    august 25-27 åbo/turku finland

Emotions, Others and the Self
Workshop abstracts
(updated 29..7.2005)

I. EMOTIONS AND THE SELF
1. G. H. Mead’s Symbolic Interactionism:
On the significance of emotional experience for self-formation
Emma Engdahl
3. Seeing the self through the other
Magnus Gustafsson
4. The Autonomous and Anonymous Self: Body and Emotions in Platonism
Pauliina Remes
5. Self-serving emotions
Judit Szalai
6. First Encounter with the Other: bodily Expressions and the Origin of personal Selfhood
Joona Taipale
7. I am – but not without you: On reporting emotions in the first person singular
Heli Tissari
8. Was it a smile or not?
Some remarks on the constitutive indeterminacy of facial expressions.
Göran Torrkulla
9. Emotion, the Self and the Unity of a Person’s Life
Sunny Yang
10. On Spinoza’s Theory of Desire
Valtteri Viljanen
II. EMOTIONS AND ETHICS
11. Emotions and the Value of Object-Attachements
Nussbaum and Klein on Emotions and the Human Good
Lene Auestad
12. Emotional Ground of Ressentiment
Dina A. Babushkina
13. Beyond control? Emotions, responsibility and goodness
Joel Backström
14. The history of emotions in western culture
Claes Ekenstam
15. Vice's Non-Innocent Victims
Iskra Fileva
16. Responding to wrongdoing: Spinoza on overcoming evil with good
Espen Gamlund
17. Solipsism and the loneliness of suffering
Ylva Gustafsson
18. The role of emotions in the relationship between suppliers and customers
Rebecca Karlsson & Peter Nynäs
19. Appropriate Pity
Stephen Leighton
20. Through the Eyes of Hatred: An Interpretation of Racism from Sartre’s Existential Phenomenology
Bart van Leeuwen
21. Guilt and shame
Stéphane Lemaire
22. Indignation, defensive attribution, and implicit theories of moral character
Claude H. Miller
23. The heterosexualisation of emotion: sexual scripts and feeling frames
Lyndsey Moon
24. Emotions and moral mistakes
Petter Nafstad
25. Philosophical clarity and untrue feelings
Hannes Nykänen
26. Transcendental guilt: On an emotional condition of moral experience
Sami Pihlström
27. Reason, passions and will in Mary Wollstonecraft’s conception of moral motivation
Martina Reuter
28. Others and perfection in Leibniz
Markku Roinila
29. ‘Now is a time for simplicity’
On the possibility of compassion without identification
Mariëtte Willemsen
III. LOVE
30. On loving persons for their own sake
Heikki Ikäheimo
31. Kierkegaard on passions of faith and love
Janne Kylliäinen
32. Duty to love
Arto Laitinen
33. Knowing me, knowing you: on love and knowing emotion
Michael Lacewing
34. Love and respect
Kate Larson
35. Learning to see what is important: love and virtue
Ivars Neiders
36. Love as a paradigm case of emotion
Heleen J. Pott
IV. EMOTIONS AND RELIGION
37. Wittgenstein, emotions and the human form of life
Steen Brock
38. The human self, identification and the instability of religious interpretation – reflections on some problems with a cognitive approach to the study of religiosity
TD Peter Nynäs
39. I am you when I am myself: The concept of mutuality in recent German philosphy and Christian mysticism
Iris Wikström
V. EMOTIONS AND ART
40. Music and Ontological Security
Kathleen Marie Higgins
41. Hearing human emotions in music — how is it possible?
Elina Packalén
42. Painting, emotion and expression
Ben Tilghman
VI. EMOTIONS AND INTENTIONALITY
43. A special way of being afraid: death, emotions, others
Kathy Behrendt
44. Merits of the concern-based construal theory of emotions
Ayca Boylu
45. Psychopharmacology and the psychoevolutionary theory of emotion:
Bridging the gap between affect-programs and system modularity
Jason St. John Oliver Campbell
46. Intentionality in Hume's theory of the passions
Åsa Carlson
47. Representational emotions represented
Pessi Lyyra
48. Pattern of emotion and excess
Dina Mendonça
49. Knowing through emotions (or: The role of emotions in epistemology)
Bengt Molander
50. True emotions
Mikko Salmela
51. Emotions as texts
Stefán Snævarr
52. The deceitful-partner case and instrumentally rational emotions
Jussi Suikkanen
53. The content of basic emotions: A strand in favour of a modest account of emotional experience
Edoardo Zamuner

I. EMOTIONS AND THE SELF
1. G. H. Mead’s Symbolic Interactionism:
On the significance of emotional experience for self-formation
Emma Engdahl
Department of Social and Political Sciences
Örebro University, Sweden

Among the classics in symbolic interactionism we find A. Smith, C. H. Cooley and G. H. Mead. Smith is commonly remembered for his idea of the invisible hand, rather than his ideas on sympathy or moral sentiments; Cooley for his idea of the looking-glass self, in the sense of self-reflection, rather than self-feeling; and Mead for how we through attitude taking become selves with minds, rather than with emotions. In this paper Mead’s thinking on self-formation is perceived from a perspective that focuses on emotion. Especially, Mead’s idea on emotional experience as a felt inhibition of our interchanges with the other is examined. As a result, a systematization of the logic behind Mead’s theory of the evolving self is presented. Three distinct forms of Mead’s most well-known notion – taking the attitude or role of the other - come to the forefront: (1) functional identification (2) self-feeling, and (3) self-reflection. By examining Mead’s symbolic interactionism from a perspective that focuses on emotion I whish to bring the body and the emotions back into the field of symbolic interactionsim. The aim is, also, to present an understanding of body and emotion as social.  

3. Seeing the self through the other
Magnus Gustafsson
Department of Industrial Management
Åbo Akademi University, Finland

The traditional theories on trust tend to describe the phenomenon as a conscious feeling or judgment that the other party does not intend harm. This view is based on a general assumption of uncertainty and can be traced back to Descartes and Hobbes and can be summed up in the question: how can we be certain they will fulfill their part of the obligation?
However, closer scrutiny shows that this view is both theoretically and empirically untenable and that the basic question itself, which underlies these theories, can be seen as a philosophicalmisunderstanding. One might as well ask: how can we be uncertain they will fulfill their obligation? As Lagerspetz (2002) points out trust is not so much a judgment as the basis for the judgment and comparable to a world-view. Thus trust is the view held by the one of the other (Gustafsson 2002) - it is based largely on the actions of the other and lies as a basis for how the actions of the other are interpreted. This definition of trust as the view of the other has also shown to be the one conforming best with how international business is conducted. 
In this paper it is argued that rather than focusing on the other, as the traditional modernist views hold, the focus should be shifted to the self. By my reflecting on the one hand, on how I am seen by you, and on the other hand my reflecting on the way I see you, a more fruitful understanding of trustworthiness and trusting is achieved. By shifting to a process of regular self-examination, specific to the personal relation, the subject shifts from one of condemnation or admiration to one of reflection.
This approach of achieving and maintaining self-consciousness through the other has been greeted by practitioners and is today used globally to manage supplier-customer relationships and the trust in them. In the paper data and experiences from this process will be elaborated on. By regularly examining the self through the eyes of the other, companies and individuals gain a better understanding of themselves and are able to maintain better relations with the other, improves solving of the problems at hand, decreases litigation and enables the company to identify its weaknesses and improve its processes in order to increase the satisfaction of the other.

4. The Autonomous and Anonymous Self: Body and Emotions in Platonism
Pauliina Remes
Department of Philosophy
University of Helsinki, Finland

The idea of emotions as perturbations of right reason is ancient. Regardless of those ancient philosophical theories which embrace emotions as a part of human life and motivation, the grim picture of Plato’s Phaedo has long dominated the way emotions have been discussed. During antiquity, steps were taken towards externalisation of the body from what became considered as a true self. What is the rationale and philosophical motivation behind a theory that divides human nature so radically in two?
In Plato’s Timaeus, the demiurge creates human souls, but leaves the creation of their bodies to the lesser gods. This move to postulate two different origins to what one might expect to constitute a unified human nature is an influential step. It divides our nature into what is soul (and often also rational) and the bodily. With respect to emotions, the most radical and inhumane view in antiquity comes out of the happy marriage between Stoicism and Platonism. For the Stoics emotions are cognitive but perversions of reason, and thereby something a wise man has merely traces of. For Platonists, emotions are a mix of cognitions, elements of desire, bodily sensations and urges. As such they carry in them an element foreign to reason. When the later Stoics and Platonists combine these two strands of thought, they not merely eradicate emotions but, as it would seem, externalise them from the self. 
The paper claims that there are two interesting motivations behind these harsh but influential views, both of which have to do with the philosophy of self. First, externalisation is a means of limiting that which is wholly and ideally actual from passive elements of human nature. By the time of Plotinus, the self had become understood in pure terms of actuality. This is important for the existence and causal efficacy of the self. The self is something that truly exists and that is a cause and principle of actions and cognitions, and therefore its nature must be active. Furthermore, only those actions which are not prompted – or, as Plotinus puts it, enchanted by the world – are expressions of purest selfhood. In his view, the body does not express selfhood in the required manner.	
Second, to say that the body does not express our selfhood in its purest form need not strip the function of the body its significance. Maurice Merleau-Ponty has noted that body encloses personal but also anonymous layers. Body is not exclusively something that we could command at will. Without our initiation or conscious involvement, it is directed to and influenced by the world. This intentionality or directedness towards the world is anonymous in the sense of conceptually preceding the personal and lying outside our circle of decision, volition and judgement. It can and does acquire different kinds of expressions through personal acts and habits, but at its foundation there is something pre-personal. To treat the body as “foreign” need thus not be its externalisation from the self but an insight about its proper function in our nature.

5. Self-serving emotions
Judit Szalai
Department of Philosophy
Central European University, Budapest, Hungary

The emotions individuals experience in any particular instance are shaped by a number of factors, such as (1) upbringing and social milieu, (2) perceived features of the situation, event, or object the emotion is directed at, and (3) the subject’s own emotional economy. Cognitivism, the trend that has formed the contemporary scene in the field of the philosophical theory of emotion, focuses on the second group, on what we may call object-related factors. The cognitivist approach construes emotions as responding to some perceived quality or value. Correspondingly, on the normative side, emotions are inappropriate when we misperceive or misjudge the relevant quality of the object, or when our reaction is disproportionate or wholly inadequate to the situation or the perceived property of the object. 
My perspective is complementary rather than antagonistic to cognitivism, engaging subject-related factors that influence the occurrence of emotions. One’s emotional life has certain driving forces and interests of its own. In non-pathological cases, we tend to find ways to avoid excessively negative emotions and seek a kind of emotional ‘well-being’. Keeping up a sufficiently positive valence of emotions—especially of emotions related to our self-image—is part, probably the most important part, of our mental health. 
Just as to object-related factors correspond object-related standards of appropriateness, subject-related factors also have their own normativity. An emotion that is seriously destructive to our self-image can be inappropriate from a subject-related point of view; just as an emotion which is incongruent with the perceived quality of the object is inappropriate from an object-related point of view. 
In thinking about our own emotions and those of other people, we tend to take the object-related perspective for granted: we assume that emotions respond primarily to the perceived properties of their objects. However, it can happen that, instead, the subject-related perspective prevails: the emotion in question primarily answers the special demands of the subject’s emotional economy. Such emotions I will call self-serving. I define self-servingness in counterfactual terms: although they may warrant the emotion, the object-related features of the situation/object would not have triggered it. Examples are emotions attached to projection, scapegoating, and the martyrdom complex. There are also examples of self-serving positive emotions, like feeling love for a famous person the subject does not personally know in order to suppress a feeling of insignificance and make her life more meaningful.
While self-serving emotions are typically good in some sense for their subjects, we may find them morally impermissible on several grounds. Self-serving emotions may have bad consequences, such as inducing undeserved feelings of guilt and inferiority in persons towards whom the emotion is directed. Moreover, it can be plausibly claimed that we treat others as means to the end of our emotional well-being in the instances of such emotions. But there is also a further aspect that makes self-serving emotions blameworthy or impermissible. With self-serving emotions, their subject violates the rules of emotional cooperation. People operate on the understanding that emotions respond to values and expect others’ emotions to be based in a perception of some value or disvalue of the object. If my emotion is not grounded in such perception or judgment, I go against this fundamental principle to all emotional behavior and at least temporarily opt out of emotional cooperation, which takes the emotional reactions of others as based in value-perception and makes people reciprocate on that assumption.

6. First Encounter with the Other: bodily Expressions and the Origin of personal Selfhood 
Joona Taipale
Department of Philosophy
University of Helsinki, Finland

When studying the themes of otherness and emotions, Husserl’s classical phenomenology is often rejected as a formal and solipsistic enterprise which is unable to deal with such problems. Derrida, for instance, writes that for Husserl the transcendental ego is “an absolute subject whose self-presence is pure and does not depend on any external affection, any outside.” In a few of his writings, Husserl indeed treats the transcendental ego as a formal ego-pole which lacks temporality and corporeality – and so it remains problematic how such ego could ever meet with others, to say nothing of having feelings. However, this formal view is not valid throughout Husserl’s work. Moreover, a careful study reveals that Husserl introduces the formal ego-pole through an explicit abstraction. In his later works, Husserl withdraws this abstraction, concretizes his account, and finally views the transcendental ego as an embodied, temporal, and intersubjective person – as a transcendental person.
In my paper, I wish to elucidate some phenomenological structures of personality. I will argue that, from Husserl’s phenomenological perspective, a full constitution of personal selfhood necessitates social relations with others. My presentation will proceed in three steps. First, I will elaborate the main features of Husserl’s concept of the transcendental person. Second, I will reveal those essential structures of the person that enable its first experience of others and the formation of social relations. I will study carefully the embodiment of subjectivity (e.g., bodily expression of emotions), and argue that this embodiment has a remarkable role in the first encounter with the other. Third, I will focus on the effects of this encounter to the self-experience of the subject by comparing the person as it is constituted prior and after the establishment of intersubjectivity. I will conclude that the transcendental ego becomes a full person only through sociality.
My presentation will thus contribute to the conference themes with a careful study of expressivity, selfhood, and otherness from the point of view of phenomenology of the person.

7. I am – but not without you: On reporting emotions in the first person singular
Heli Tissari
Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, Finland

In the course of my linguistic work on words denoting emotions, I have come to pay special attention to phrases attesting a first person singular form. Such phrases often seem to be used at least as much for reasons of politeness (reaching out to another person) or custom (reaching out to another person in a culturally conditioned manner) as out of a wish to give an expression to what one feels. In other words, they are used not only to communicate in relationships but in order to create, mold and uphold relationships. 
Baranczak (1990: 12) gives an example of a culturally bound usage of the English word happy: “The question one hears at (stand-up) parties – “Is everybody happy?” – if translated literally into Polish, would seem to come from a metaphysical treatise or a political utopia rather than from social chitcat.” The following is an example of a first person usage of happy in (imaginary) dialogue: 
“She’s decided the Empire Road launderette isn’t as good as the old one, in Cambridge Street, though,” he told Mrs Ames. “It mangles up the clothes, she says. Had you noticed that at all?” “No, I’m happy with it.” “Yes.” “They come out very clean.” “So I thought.” 
Here, one might say that the phrase I’m happy serves the purpose not only of expressing satisfaction (evaluating something) but also of agreement and bonding (cultivating a relationship), in response to “she says”, “had you noticed”, and in anticipation of “so I thought”.  
The example originally comes from a novel Gentleman and ladies by Susan Hill, but I picked it out of the hundred-million-word British National Corpus, an electronic resource for studying written and spoken present-day British English. My plan for this paper is to analyse similar data on a number of phrases beginning with I am/I’m (amazed, angry, anxious, ashamed, delighted, disgusted, glad, happy, proud, sad, surprised, worried) in order to describe to what extent their usage relates to (a) reporting an emotion, (b) reporting facts/news (e.g. “I am proud to tell you”), (c) evaluating something or someone, and (d) cultivating a relationship or relationships. 
To begin with, it is interesting if not terribly surprising to notice that phrases attesting positive emotions are much more frequent in the corpus than phrases attesting negative emotions. I’m glad occurs 1,171 times as against I’m worried (174), I’m ashamed (56), and I’m disgusted (24). Besides noticing that it is more acceptable to express positive than negative emotions, one ought not to forget that creating and maintaining a positive atmosphere is a valuable tool for persuasion. Hardly all the interpersonal work which involves these phrases is likely to be “democratically bidirectional”.

8. Was it a smile or not? 
Some remarks on the constitutive indeterminacy of facial expressions.
Göran Torrkulla
Department of Philosophy
Åbo Akademi University, Finland

In this paper I want to question some common philosophical assumption about the expressiveness of the human face, especially focusing on misleading attempts to assimilate the plurality of expressions to a general paradigm of patterns in order to come to terms with the unpredictability of spontaneous human behaviour. My aim is to show that difficulties in understanding each other’s moods and attitudes usually are not due to some kind of epistemic defects, but rather consist in a certain lack of attention to the specific embeddedness of our expressions and the different responses they meet, but also in a certain neglect concerning the relations between the persons involved (and/or our own relation to them and the situation). This does not, however, mean that the context - including the conventions of the common background - as such decides how a certain expression is to be taken, but that the very intelligibility of our judgements about the meaning of it, demands that we take into account the variability and irregularity of the ways in which we respond to each other, and at the same time also the very fact that we do not view human behaviour from a neutral stance, i.e. that our judgments internally depend on whether we like the person, trust or know him or her well enough and so on. In cases of disagreement about, say, the sincerity of someone’s words or expressions, the undecidability neither implies a deficiency in skill or knowledge, nor an inadequate command of certain terms. This indeterminacy is not an accidental but a constitutive feature of those judgements, setting them apart from for instance judgements about the size of physical objects, and thus pointing to important similarities to aesthetic and moral judgements. In short, there is no definite answer to what combination of elements is necessary or sufficient for a certain type of facial expressions - smiles may be part of anger, fear and sorrow, and people who are happy need not smile, and in that sense there are no conclusive criteria - no proofs - that can be used to settle disputes of this kind. Instead the variations themselves are part of the very background of understanding expressions of moods and emotions, and are thus constitutive for the meaning of the concepts we apply. To be sure, there are criteria, but they are not themselves beyond dispute, and appealing to them requires the same degree of insight as making the judgements themselves. My main contention is that we should carefully attend to the situated expressive actions and their internal relations between response and responsibility - which ultimately does not confront us with a problem of knowledge but rather a problem of the will, and accordingly with a moral task.

9. Emotion, the Self and the Unity of a Person’s Life
Sunny Yang
University of Durham

What are the conditions under which a girl A at time t and 10 years later, a woman B, are the very same person? To answer this question, I begin with the Hume’s theory of personal identity. Hume’s official view, according to which the self is a bundle of perceptions, cannot explain the unity of a person’s life. Hume addresses personal identity in Book 1 of the Treatise almost exclusively in terms of the relationship of the present self to its past, primarily in terms of causation and memory so that he faces difficulties explaining the unity of a person’s life. But it should be noted that Hume also holds that the self is extended through time and that a person’s life is a projection over time with regard to emotion. In Book 2 of the Treatise Hume attempts to explain why past perceptions, thoughts, and actions affect my present feelings, and therefore why these feelings influence my future. He introduces a further causal relation into the account of the self—the relation between intention and action. He explains why I act from concern for a future that will bear to me, now, the relation I bear to my past. Hence he argues that in thinking of myself in the future I am thinking of actions that follow from my motives, intentions and character. 
Although his view in Book 2 fares better than Book 1 in the sense that he tries to unify the diachronic expansion of a person’s life in terms of its influence on emotion, I argue that this view has defects as well. It seems to me that in order for Hume’s view of personal identity in terms of emotion and tense to be plausible, Hume must take notice of the notion of ‘the experiential content of memory’ which is embedded in certain feelings. That experiential memory plays a central role in explaining personal identity has been neglected by many philosophers in the mental connectedness tradition. In order to understand memory as experiential, we need to understand the affective tendency attached to some memory. I argue that memory affects not only my past thought but also my past emotions and those emotions deriving from the past stay on to affect my whole being and my future. Thus for example the shame or regret that I experience when I remember my past wrongdoing represent the whole of me up to now as well as at that time. 
If we adopt the notion of experiential memory to identify mental connectedness with personal identity, we bring the person under the influence of his past, such that the past is reconstructed and then influences the future. Hence, a life- the diachronic expansion of a person- is unified. If this is right, I argue, the problem of personal identity can be resolved in terms of personal history understood from a person’s own perspective (e.g. emotion).

10. On Spinoza’s Theory of Desire
Valtteri Viljanen
Department of Philosophy
University of Turku, Finland

According to Spinoza, desire (cupiditas) is one of the three primary emotions – the other two being joy and sadness – and obviously the most basic one, since it is identified with the human essence itself. Thus, the aim of my paper is to provide an account of Spinoza’s theory of desire. My interpretation rests on the contention that Spinoza holds temporal being to be something fundamentally dynamic, i.e., something that should be described first and foremost as relations of power between finite things. The concept of desire has a key role with regard to this kind of dynamism. However, in order to understand the Spinozistic theory of desire I examine first, through a series of intertwined questions, the ontological foundations on which it is built.
I begin by expounding Spinoza’s view of finite things’ essence as striving (conatus) to persevere in being. Next I examine how he thinks about individuals and bring forth that a complex individual’s persistence in being requires maintaining the simpler elements, of which the individual is composed, in a certain fixed relation. Accordingly, each physical individual has a characteristic structure, constituted by innumerable simple bodies in the required interactive configuration; the conatus power must preserve this structure for the individual to stay in existence.
To give an account of the temporal changes taking place in individuals, a distinction should be made between the individual’s constant essential power (i.e. conatus) and continually changing power of acting (agendi potentia). But if the essential power and structure remain the same while the power of acting changes, it must be asked how is this in fact possible. I shall argue that Spinoza answers this question with his theory of constitution of essences in temporality: any individual with an essence is constituted (i.e., realised in temporality) varyingly depending on the concrete circumstances it encounters, and having a clear grasp of this doctrine is crucial for the correct understanding of Spinoza’s theory of desire.
After these considerations it is possible to tackle the issues concerning emotions. I argue that as the individual is constituted varyingly its conatus power must be continuously determined or oriented anew, and Spinoza speaks of this kind of concretely determined conatus as desire. In other words, if the essential striving was not ceaselessly re-oriented, according to prevailing circumstances, the individual would not be able to maintain its structure for too long; an inflexible conatus would be of no use. Also joy and sadness must be understood in connection with our conatus power and its realisation – in which other human beings and society can help us, giving us joy. So, Spinoza’s theory of desire draws attention to the fact that any individual’s essential power is sensitive to the varying requirements of temporal existence. To my mind, this line of thinking provides us an original insight into human existence: we are dynamic beings of desire, never emotionless, and the Spinozistic ethics is all about finding out how to make our desires as rational and active as possible.
II. EMOTIONS AND ETHICS

11. Emotions and the Value of Object-Attachements
Nussbaum and Klein on Emotions and the Human Good
Lene Auestad
Department of Philosophy
Oslo University, Norway

Martha Nussbaum's philosophical contributions have been central to the reassessment of the importance of the role of emotions in ethics and political theory. Her arguments to the effect that emotions are complex responses to what is valuable and important in human lives, and hence that moral psychology should be regarded as being essential to moral and political theory, have established her position as one of the most central ethical theorists of today. Emotions, to Nussbaum, are not merely motivations supporting or subverting one's choice to act according to moral principles, rather they are part and parcel of the system of moral reasoning. Thus, a repudiation of the claim of non-cognitivists, that emotions are phenomena of a kind that are expressive only, and hence that they cannot make claims to truth or validity, is central to her position. 
Nussbaum defends the view of the Greek Stoic Chrysippus, that an emotion is itself identical with the full acceptance or recognition of a belief. Hence she excludes the possibility of there being constituent parts of an emotion that are not themselves part of the judgment, i.e. of an emotion containing non-cognitive or bodily elements. That is to say, although it generally feels like something to have an emotion, the fact that emotions are experienced in certain ways should not be part of the definition of emotions. Nor should concrete feeling-states such as trembling or boiling enter the definition of what an emotion is. Hence feelings, to Nussbaum, understood as experiences of having emotions, described either phenomenologically or physiologically, should not be included in definitions of emotions.
I shall argue, to the contrary, that non-cognitive, bodily elements should be regarded as constituent parts of an emotion, and hence that a judgment or belief is not sufficient for the existence of an emotion. The psychoanalytic object-relations theory of Melanie Klein is particularly well suited to make this point. The two theorists overlap in seeing emotions as concerned with attachments to significant others, while Klein's theory gives a better account of some significant phenomenal qualities of emotional states. It is argued that the felt urgency and physical upheaval and exhaustion, the phenomena of emotional conflict and of defence and the fact that emotions colour and shape experience, rather than being simply responsive to situations encountered, are more plausibly accounted for in a theory which recognizes non-cognitive components of emotions. Lastly, I shall sketch very briefly a few implications for ethics, arguing that Nussbaum’s moral argument about self-sufficiency and vulnerability is not as much an issue of choice as she suggests, that some of her definitions of emotions are unduly cognitively heavy and that in her account the foundational nature of attachments to others, along with cases of more spontaneous other-directedness, are overlooked.

12. Emotional Ground of Ressentiment
Dina A. Babushkina
Saint-Petersburg State University, Russia

Aristotle once defined a man as a social being, since then philosophy considers him/her to be included in a wide system of relations with others. It believes that to be a person one should share his/her existence with an other. I have not only to be with another person but, existing, to take into account existence of an other; to limit my freedom by his/her freedom. 
For a man there are two ways: either he/she lives a life oriented to the other and makes the other a constitutive element of him/herself; or he/she doesn’t. Human existence thus has two modi: ressentiment-being and will-to-power (Nietzshe). I am going to focus on the first for it presupposes relation to others. The aim of the paper is 1) to ague that being of resentment-person is essentially emotional; 2) to view the role of emotions in his/her life and 3) to identify what a particular emotion means for another person who is related to the ressentiment-person. My main thesis is – a certain emotion is itself an expression of symbolizing work of mind and represents one’s attitude to the action of another person. By the emotion we can understand how a person evaluates this action.
Ressentiment can be widely defined as a re-action. In a situation of ressentiment the following schema takes place: a person acts towards the ressentiment-person, who suffers and experiences a certain emotion; then ressentiment-person re-acts towards the actor who has affected him. The re-action is mediated by emotion, it is not thus immediate. In fact, the ressentiment-person converts the action of another man in his/her mind, creating and idea of it. So the original action gets a new, symbolic meaning. This ideal action, being what it is due to the emotion the original action arouses in the ressentiment-person, causes the re-action. Emotion thus has a converting power. It has a certain mechanism: being an attitude (reply, return) to the action, emotion is essentially a negation. “Ideal” action – is not the action itself. Emotion arises on the ground of action of an other and exists as a reply, but as such it presents another, inner reality of the ressentiment-person, where this action exists as an idea. Re-action is affirmation of a meaning as a negation. Re-acting the ressentiment-person externalizes his inner world, he/she exercises a reply to what in his/her mind means the action of the other, otherwise to a  evaluated, symbolic action. 
The capacity of emotional mediation of a return action grounds such human capacities as reason, fancy, memory, conscience (Nietzshe). These are the spheres of symbolic. Different types of emotions, that immediately follows the effect and mediate the re-action making it meaningful, play important role in inter-personal relationship. To make the interaction clear and meaningful, these types of emotions are cultivated in a person (by such violent institutions as: school, prison, clinic etc.). He is trained to feel this or that emotion in particular situation, and his is expected to feel it and re-act in a certain way. If he doesn’t, we consider him as an alien or simply strange. 

13. Beyond control? Emotions, responsibility and goodness
Joel Backström
Department of Philosophy
Åbo Akademi University, Finland

The question of the place of emotions in ethics is often posed in terms of the extent (if any) to which we can control or change, and so be held responsible for, our emotions. Some contend that emotions in general are beyond our control: what counts morally is therefore not what we feel (we can’t help that) but how we act. This schizoid view is obviously untenable. What we feel for each other is not morally neutral at all, but the very centre of our moral life. It is not just that we can feel (note the word!) guilty for our feelings, but also that what we do cannot be separated from what we feel, for the significance of an act is determined (not only, but essentially) by the feelings that motivated and were expressed in it (or, again, by the lack of feeling manifested in it).
A second view recognizes the moral relevance of emotions: it holds that, although we cannot simply decide what to feel, we can influence our emotions by psycho-pedagogical means, and so be held indirectly responsible for them (perhaps for having let ourselves become the kind of person who tends to have certain feelings). Here, our emotions are seen as a given, psychological material we are called upon to beat into shape. I argue that this view, too, misconceives our relation to our emotions by falsely objectifying it, in two ways. 
First, what we feel for others is not primarily an “area of our lives” that presents itself as a task for us as morally responsible beings; rather, our responsibility is itself (just as guilt or remorse) something we feel; we feel a need to work on particular patterns of emotional response because we already, on a more elemental level, are emotionally open to them. Morally bad (or evil) emotions - envy, spite, greed, irritation, hate and so on - are bad (evil) because in them we reject this openness, shut ourselves out from each other in setting ourselves against each other.
Secondly, if I set to work on controlling an emotion, viewing it as somehow just “given,” I am refusing responsibility for what is in fact all mine. It is not (as I pretend) that I find there is envy in me; rather I envy you, I am envious, but it is (I argue) a basic characteristic of bad (evil) emotions that in feeling them we falsely present ourselves as either helpless victims of a passion beyond our control, or as simply reacting to the situation in a self-evidently “natural” way (thus vindictiveness may appear as a mad rage or as a dispassionate reaction, simply a matter of determining the “appropriate punishment”). 
Evil is characterized by this letting circumstances outside or forces inside one take over, absenting oneself in rejecting others; goodness, on the other hand, means being oneself in opening up to others. Goodness does not mean controlling or working on one’s emotions - only bad emotions can, in any case, be controlled. Goodness really is beyond control: one can only open oneself to it in opening one’s heart to others.

14. The history of emotions in western culture
Claes Ekenstam
Dep. of History of Ideas and Theory of science
Göteborg University, Sweden

The neurologist Antonio R. Damasio has pleaded for the central part that feelings constitute in most of the functions of the human brain and organism. Damasio also comments on the marginalization of feeling in traditioninal science: in philosophy feelings have not really been trusted and in neurology feelings have been considered too subjective, undefined and hazy to bee studied scientifically. In addition, emotions are the oppossite of reason, which is considered the best human quality and independent of feelings. But the division between consciousness and brain, as well as between mind and body/feelings, is a fiction. Damasio emphasize that we must overcome the deep split between body and consciousness in western medicine. However, he adds, a complete understanding of the human brain and the way it generates human consciousness and behaviour, also need a consideration of cultural conditions.
It is excactly this issue I want to focus on, that is, the cultural process in history, which has deported the human feelings to a secondary place, both in scientific thought and in dominant mentality. In philosophical, religious and literary texts from ancient and biblical times, or the Middle Ages, feelings are valued and figured very different from modern times. Something seems to happen in history, which takes feelings away from science and out of our everyday consciousness, and in a sense, have made feelings to a stranger to ourself.
As early as 1939 the German sociologist Norbert Elias published his work on the civilization process. There Elias established an historical psychology, by studying the connection between changes in the human psychological structure and society. Beginning in the Middle Ages, continuing through the Renaissance and with a marked intensification in the process during the 17th and 18th centuries, the emotional life and behaviour of Western man has slowly changed. Impulses, aggressions and other feelings have been internalized, Elias argues, concurrently with human behaviour becoming more refined, formalized and rationalized. Personal self-control has over time become firm, coprehensive and complicated. An invisible wall has slowly emerged between the inner world of the individual and the surrounding world, between the individual and society, but also between reason and feelings of each person. An inner threshold has historically been created by socially induced prohibitions and restrictions, together with their psychic counterparts, socially induced anxieties, pleasure and displeasure, distaste and delight, which together regulate what can be expressed or must be repressed.
Surely the argument of Elias must be nuanced in the light of new research and some of his theses modified, but I still think that some of his main theses are solid.
In my presentation I want to describe the psychological underworld of the modern Western man, seen in the light of the civilizatorical process which have changed our behaviour, our experience and way of thinking about ourselves as bodily and feeling creatures. Particularly I pay attention to historical changes in emotional life, because this aspect seems to have a key role. If feelings have been deported to an psychological underworld as an internal other for our consciousness, this internal other also becomes the fundation for our social relations to other people. The denied and low valued feelings has been projected on subordinated groups of human beings (black people, Asians, Indians, women, children) by privileged western males, who had ruled the world. The history of feelings is intimately connected to the history of gender. Conception of masculinity and femininity have often been decoded in association to specific feelings and plea for self-control.
I want to bring together various research done on the cultural history of emotions and synthesize it. My focus is on changes in the expression and intensity of feelings, and the impact these changes has had on human relations. 

15. Vice's Non-Innocent Victims
Iskra Fileva
Department of Philosophy
Boston University, USA

There are strings in the human heart that had better not be vibrated. 
 Charles Dickens 

Emotions do not seem to be fully within our control and we do not want our own morality to depend on what lies outside our control. Yet, we sometimes experience emotions that do seem to have an immoral ring to them – jealousy, anger, envy, greed to mention but some. So is there or isn’t there something immoral about such emotions and if yes, do we have a way to deal with that kind of immorality of ours? Or is it that a man could be vicious in the way in which a non-human animal is said to be? 
In the Christian tradition the answer to the first question is ‘yes’. Aquinas used the phrase ‘capital vices’ as simply a synonym of ‘seven deadly sins’ and the ‘vices’ in question included for him the experience of emotions such as envy, anger and greed. 
 But Aquinas had resort to the grace of God as that external force which can magically purify our hearts if we only so desire strongly enough.
Kant made an attempt to purge morality from emotions and reduce it to what can be ‘commanded’ of us. But emotions cannot be commanded and so can neither add not take from an action’s ‘moral worth’. Aristotle, on the other hand, did not wish to ban emotions outside the sphere of ethics but he had the hope that emotions could, ultimately, be brought within our control - through the right kind of practice. And even before we’ve succeeded in aligning our emotions with the way in which we would like them to be, we are not vicious if we are trying. 
Today we have no resort to the Grace of God, do not wish, pace Kant, to ban emotions entirely out of ethics and have two problems with Aristotle’s solution to the question at hand: first, it is not clear how successfully we can deal with our own negative emotions even through a persistent attempts. Second, and more importantly, today we are no longer certain that it is good for us to try to do so – some emotions, negative though they may be and immoral though they might have traditionally seem are natural - that was the lesson of Freud and post-Freudian psychology. 
In a recent article under the title ‘Concealment and Exposure’ Thomas Nagel has argued the point in some detail traced its consequences. Many of us, Nagel maintains, are secretly racists, secretly envy the success of friends and secretly wish bad things to happen to others. But the proper response to this condition of ours, is, according to Nagel, to relegate such experiences to a ‘private sphere’ and give up on any attempt of subjecting that private sphere public morel standards – it is just healthy, Nagel’s intuition seems to be, to indulge in some such emotions. 
Now, it is my conviction that we need to try to deal with negative emotions since I think that, for the most part, it isn’t really healthy to indulge in them. And I do think, like Aristotle, that it is possible to deal with them. But the way in which we can do so, I want to argue in the present paper, is not through habituating ourselves to good ways of acting in the hope that feelings will follow suit. The burden of responsibility for emotions such as jealousy, envy and greed, I intend to hold, is on the part not of the one who feels them but of the one who provokes them. Consider the case of Mozart - however willing we may be to accept everything which Mozart does and even join him in the ridicule of Salieri, we should admit, upon some reflection, that Salieri’s envy of Mozart’s success was largely due to Mozart himself. A person with many natural qualities and talents usually knows full well that he or she is likely to provoke envy in others and should make an attempt to not provoke it. And there are, I shall maintain, way to do so. Mozart, on the other hand, did almost as much as he could to trigger from not-so gifted competitor the allegedly immoral emotion of envy. The main thesis I wish to defend here is that the best way for us to deal with our negative emotions is to attempt to do so together. 
To this end I proceed as follows. I first take the question on what grounds emotions could be subject to moral evaluation at all despite not being fully within our control. (I) I then discuss Nagel’s proposal of relegating the bulk of emotions with negative tuning to a private sphere to which no traditional public standards are applicable. I claim that Nagel’s proposal is unacceptable as it stands. (II) I argue that that those who have traditionally been taken to be the ‘victims’ of vice are really ‘non-innocent’ victims and that they both can and should make and attempt to forestall the ‘vicious’ feelings of others. This will help us answer both the question whether we should try to bring morally suspect emotions within our own control and the question what is the way to do that. (III)

16. Responding to wrongdoing: Spinoza on overcoming evil with good 
Espen Gamlund
Department of Philosophy
University of Oslo, Norway

This article addresses the following question: How do we respond and how should we respond, according to Spinoza, when confronting other people’s wrongdoing towards ourselves or towards a third party? I shall consider three possible responses: (1) retribution, (2) restoration, and (3) reciprocity. The most ancient of these is retribution. It is still very much with us. According to this response, we should overcome evil with evil – responding to other’s anger, hatred or violence with mutual anger, hatred or violence. Retribution has been tamed more or less by restoration within the framework of morals and law, backed up by political power. This response can be said to consist of a wish on the part of the victim to control the need for revenge, and so avoid a negative interaction spiral. Reciprocity has been offered as an alternative within various traditions, but has not been explored to the same extent as the first two. Here the victim seeks to overcome the anger, hatred or violence that he receives from others, with love, forgiveness and nonviolence. On this view, the wrongdoer is forgiven for his wrongdoings and the claim for revenge, just compensation or punishment is abandoned. 
My assumption is that Spinoza’s theory of affects offers a possible theoretical foundation for reciprocity, and this is what I wish to clarify in my article. According to Spinoza, overcoming evil with good along these lines depends on freedom from the emotions of anger, hatred, resentment etc. One basic question is how this freedom is achieved? For one thing, Spinoza assumes that there is an intimate relationship between emotions and self-understanding, and accordingly between emotions, self-understanding and moral action. In this connection, Spinoza’s distinction between inadequate and adequate cognition is especially interesting, and also his distinction between passive and active affects. The assumption is that the more a person has adequate cognition and active affects, the more he will be able to respond to wrongdoing with love, forgiveness and nonviolence. Conversely, the more a person has inadequate cognition and passive affects, the more he will be disposed to respond to wrongdoing with anger, hatred and violence. The turning point becomes how each person can transform passive into active affects. In the Ethics, Spinoza summarises several remedies for such a transition to active affects. A careful investigation of these remedies would, I believe, prove helpful in determining how a person may transform his motivational structure from negative to positive emotions, attitudes, and actions. For Spinoza, such a transformation has both individual and social implications; freedom, in his theory, affects the relations to other persons as much as the state of the individual person. This will be central to my investigation.

17. Solipsism and the loneliness of suffering
Ylva Gustafsson
Department of Philosophy
Åbo Akademi University, Finland

I aim to discuss the thought that we can’t know what goes on inside another human being and, consequently, that we can’t understand or know what other people feel. Several philosophers have criticized this thought and shown that we understand what it means to feel something by seeing how the feeling gets a place in the person’s life. For instance, we understand that someone is in pain by seeing that the person can’t walk, that he lies in bed moaning etc. An important point connected to this is that our understanding of other people’s feelings is not a neutral observation but rather my understanding expresses a moral attitude towards the other person. In this sense compassion and a will to help the suffering person is an expression of my understanding that another person is in pain.  
However, there can be a character of loneliness and exposedness in serious suffering that generally seems to be forgotten in the criticism of solipsism as well as in discussions of compassion. It is true that compassion is an important expression of our understanding another person’s suffering, but sometimes we can’t help the one who suffers no matter how much we want to. Compassion can be a difficult experience of helplessness in front of another person’s suffering rather than an experience of being able to help or console. 
Suffering can also be an isolating experience in many ways, you might feel isolated because you can’t take part in your children’s joys even in your mind because the pain is so strong that you can’t think of anything else for months, or you can’t talk to others about your experience because you are ashamed or because you feel that your experience is too far removed from a normal, happy life etc. But, people may also close themselves off from others in their suffering and in this sense we may also be responsible for our own loneliness. The point is that loneliness and helplessness enter into both compassion and suffering in many ways and in this sense the solipsistic thought should not be dismissed right away, which again does not mean that the solipsist is right. The problem with the solipsist is that he sees the loneliness as a matter of epistemology rather than as an expression suffering. The loneliness of suffering is something Stanley Cavell also discusses in his book Must we mean what we say?. My discussion will follow his line of thought.

Literature:
Cavell, S. 1969. “Knowing and Acknowledging” in Must we mean what we say?. New York: Charles Scribner’s sons.

18. The role of emotions in the relationship between suppliers and customers
Rebecca Karlsson & Peter Nynäs
Åbo Akademi Univeristy, PBI-Research Institute for Project-Based Industry, Finland

In the international shipping industry, the people involved have to adjust to several surprising events for example regarding the operation of the engine on the vessels. Some equipment might break down and therefore, in the need of spare parts or in the need of help with service of the broken equipment, the shipping companies have to be in contact with the manufacturers. When it comes to the relationship between the manufacturers and the shipping companies, emotions play a significant role both in the interpersonal relationship as well as in a broader social context. An interesting question is in which senses emotions play a part in the interaction between the customers and suppliers.
Taking into account the human interplay at hand in the relationship between customers and suppliers in the international shipping industry, we wish to discuss the role of emotions. As empirical data we use customer interviews recently conducted in Monaco and Italy. The interviewees are customers of a global manufacturer, whose main office is in Finland. With basis in this empirical data consisting of three customer interviews, we will draw attention to the following questions: In which way do the views of the self and the other influence the personal relationship? Which role does stereotypical images of the self and the other play? How are boundaries between people and organisations created, recreated and crossed?	
In other words, we wish to take a closer look at the interpersonal relationship, stressing the fact that all encounters are human encounters. However, these relationships cannot be taken out of their social context. Therefore the question is what happens to the interpretation of the interpersonal relationship, when taking a closer look at the organisational context. What happens regarding the emotions in the interaction between customers and supplier when emphasising the social context?

19. Appropriate Pity
Stephen Leighton
Department of Philosophy
Queen's University, Kingston, Canada

This paper addresses our current ambivalence about the appropriateness of feeling pity for others. After reflecting on the occurrence of this ambivalence, and some historical reasons for its genesis, the paper moves outside our cultural milieu to consider a less contended conception of pity. Socrates’ refusal to appeal to pity at his trial becomes the locus of this discussion, considered from a generally Aristotelian perspective. The argument explores pity, compares and contrasts it with shame, draws analogies with friendship, speaks to the differences amongst being pitied, asking for and demanding it, concluding that pity on this conception is a passion appropriate to offer and receive — and remains available to us. Even so, a reluctance to be pitied can be anticipated: it is arguable that being pitied can interfere with the project of fashioning a meaningful life. This challenge is taken up, as is a contrast between it and compassion.

20. Through the Eyes of Hatred: An Interpretation of Racism from Sartre’s Existential Phenomenology
Bart van Leeuwen
University of Amsterdam
Department of Philosophy
Amsterdam, The Netherlands

The theoretical contribution of philosophy to the understanding of racism has been very limited. Philosophy is mainly concerned with the moral justification of the universal respect for human life and cultural differences. But philosophy must also critically interpret the phenomenon it morally condemns, namely, racism. The goal of this research project is to interpret some of the structural aspects of racist hatred in the context of Sartre’s existential phenomenology and his emotion theory. The research question is whether Sartre’s negative model of intersubjectivity can help us gain insights into the affective-dynamic aspects of racism and in what way racism can be understood as a kind of “bad faith” (mauvaise foi), namely, as a flight from human indeterminacy and responsibility. The methodological approach is an empirically checked phenomenology, by checking our interpretation of racism with the results of social science.
Bad faith (mauvaise foi) is a technical concept that Sartre develops in L’être et le néant and that refers to a flight for the truth of the human condition, which is characterised by an irreducible freedom and responsibility. According to Sartre this sense of freedom leads to anguish and bad faith is an escape from it. Racism is one of the manifestations of bad faith. Racism is an escape from human indeterminacy (le néant) to the order of things (l’être), a solidification of freedom to total ethnic security. The racist sees himself and the group to which he belongs as massive and impenetrable, solid like a rock. Furthermore, this self-reification is constructed from positive qualities while the outsider is reduced to a bundle of inferior features.
What is crucial for the analysis of racism in terms of bad faith is that it is not fear itself that is central to the racist attitude, as some claim it is, but instead it is a transformation of this fear into qualitatively different feelings such as contempt, hatred, sadistic pleasure or — less dramatically — a sense of comfort. The motive for racism seems to be the discomfort or even fear that accompanies the sense of one’s own freedom and that of the other, but in response to that, the ethnic other is, to the contrary, not experienced as an abyss-like indeterminacy. The racist sees the black man as coinciding completely with his deficient features. For him, the “nigger” over there is an obscene presence, a surplus. The other can only be a destabilising “leak” in one’s universe if one recognises his subjectivity. However, the racist has filled this leak by attributing rigid qualities to himself and to members of his own group, just as he attributes solid features to outsiders (albeit different qualities). So racism seems to presuppose a transformation. We will examine this further with Sartre’s emotion theory.
Racism, according to Sartre, must not be seen as an ‘opinion’, but as a passion. Passions in Sartre’s emotion theory are to be understood as magical transformations of a difficult world. To be of any use, Sartre’s emotion theory must be refined. Firstly, we have to formulate a critique of the dichotomous character of Sartre’s two-world ontology. Secondly, we have to work out a distinction between reasonable/appropriate emotions on the one hand, and, on the other hand, emotions that imply a sort of escapism, the magical emotions. These magical emotions offer a further theoretical insight into the ‘heart’ of racism. Racism is at its root a form of Manichaeism. For the racist, the social word is divided into “pure good” and “pure evil”. This Manichaeism can be seen as the result of a magical transformation.

21. Guilt and shame
Stéphane Lemaire
CREUM
Montréal and IJN Paris, Canada

I propose to show that guilt and shame result from a single emotional process that relies critically on entrenched standards. This is a kind of judgmentalism about shame and guilt. In both cases, we experience the emotion while judging that we do not live up to the standards. A judgment has to be present for shame and guilt because if it were not present, we would not know that we experience shame or guilt. It would be a kind of anxiety or sadness related to a situation but not guilt or shame. Anti-judgmentalists like d’Arms and Jacobson (2003) have argued against such views that one may experience guilt without believing that one is guilty of a wrong act and that this fact is harder to understand on the judgmentalist view. My reply is that belief can also be held irrationally, and even against all evidences. One can be unable to resist to the belief that one is guilty even if one knows that nothing was possible to prevent the death of a relative. Hence, I propose to introduce between their two categories of non-jugdmentalist basic emotions and “cognitively sharpened” emotions, a third category of basic judgmentalist emotions.
My second contention is that the differences in scenarios between shame and guilt (Tangney et al. 1996) results from the existence in our culture of a specific sort of standard violations: the situations in which one can say of the person who does not conform to the standard that he is guilty (of a wrong act), an act that he could have not done and for which there are available rituals of forgiveness or of punishment. In other words, the only real distinction between shame and guilt is a distinction between the norms involved, it is a difference in our normative system and this distinction may not be present in other cultures or along different lines. The distinction here is analogue to a distinction between fear of spider and fear of snakes: a difference in content, or in types of content does not make a difference in emotion if the processes are similar. Moreover and in the case at hand, this seems very plausible since the two emotions are acquired at the same age.
Several differences between the scripts or scenarios of shame and guilt can be deduced from the distinction in standards. Both emotions imply a disposition to get rid of the painful experience but since reparation is only available for wrong acts and not for insufficiencies like the lack of courage, this disposition will trigger different desires. This difference in the motivation coming out from shame and guilt is not different from the different motivations that experiences of fear can trigger. Given our capacities and the particular situation, fear will motivate us to do very different thing. It explains also why shame seems more focused on the self since it is easier to get rid of guilt through acts of reparation.
But couldn’t we find other differences? One often alludes to a difference in behavior: shame could be distinguished by a behavior of gaze avoidance. But this behavior may be present with guilt if one doesn’t avow and is not present when one experiences shame alone. Moreover, shame can be experienced alone. Finally, gaze avoidance is a more general submissive behavior.

References
D’Arms J. and Jacobson D., 2003. “The significance of recalcitrant emotion (or, anti-quasijudgmentalism)”. In A. Hatzimoysis (ed) Philosophy and the Emotions, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Tangney et al. 1996, « Are Shame, Guilt, and Embarrassment Distinct Emotions ? ». Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 70, n°6 : 1256-69.

22. Indignation, defensive attribution, and implicit theories of moral character
Claude H. Miller
Dept of Communication
The University of Oklahoma, USA

Although few people would dispute that suffering an indignity is an unpleasant experience, one nevertheless often notices those who seem to positively revel in their own self-righteous outrage. Why are some people so quick to take offense at the slightest provocation, while others seem virtually impervious? If indignation is such an aversive communication experience, why do some people look to take offense with such exuberance? The answer may lie in the communicative function and utility of this richly complex emotion. 
While the experience and expression of indignation have great utility in shaping and regulating human behavior—particularly communication behavior—indignation is not well defined anywhere in the emotion or social psychology literatures. The present research examines the nature and generation of this attribution-based emotion by investigating certain defensive attributional processes, and exploring the relationship between the implicitly held theories people use to form attributions, and their tendency to take offense in various situations. This paper begins with a detailed definition of indignation, followed by a review of implicit attribution theory, and a brief analysis of the nature of responsibility and blame. After, an outline of defensive attribution theory, findings from two studies are presented in support of two sets of hypotheses linking implicit and defensive attribution processes to the cognitive and affective experience of indignation.
Indignation is defined as a discrete, non-primary, attribution-based, social emotion, expressing disapproval of a blameworthy action explicitly perceived to be in violation of social standards, and implicitly perceived to be injurious to the self-concept. The two experiments presented attempted to influence the defensive attribution process by manipulating apparent similarity between participants and an imagined offender, while exploring the association between implicit theory of moral character (ITM) position and measures indicative of indignation. Two implicit attribution theory perspectives are examined: Entity theorists believe that personal moral attributes are fixed and unchanging, while incremental theorists believe that personal moral attributes are malleable. Entity theorists, who tend to base their attributions on internal, characterological, dispositional information, were hypothesized to show greater indignation after offensive episodes than incremental theorists, who tend to exert more effort in gathering external situation-relevant information for use in forming their attributions. As hypothesized, those holding an implicit entity theory position responded with significantly higher levels of indignation after offensive episodes than did those holding an implicit incremental theory position. A second set of hypotheses predicting an interaction between ITM position and similarity received partial support. 
Indignation can be a powerful emotion with great impact on various intrapsychic processes, as well as on many aspects of interpersonal, intercultural, and mass mediated communication. The importance of the present work lies in its attempt to make an initial exploration into the nature of this dynamically potent, yet relatively unexamined emotion. Previous research has demonstrated how effort, because it gives a negative message about ability, is something to be avoided by entity theorists. However, within an incremental framework of understanding, effort is critical to personal achievement and the development of self-esteem. For those without an incremental theory of moral character to guide their person perception, indignation may be a particularly useful emotion, for it can offer both an alternative to effort, as well as an effective means of achieving and/or maintaining self-esteem.

23. The heterosexualisation of emotion: sexual scripts and feeling frames
Lyndsey Moon

Sexual script theorists suggest that we negotiate sexual scripts in the formation of a sexual identity. Sociologists of emotion suggest that emotions are core to identity and are embodied, connecting an actor to the world, culture and self. In this paper it is argued that that alongside a sexual identity, an identity of emotion emerges which is strongly related to dominant sexual scripts and the sexual identity of self and other.  It is also argued that emotion is attributed to real or imagined ‘feeling states’ through culturally and historically specific emotion words. Feelings are used to organise or frame experiences of everyday life and mediate the relationship we have with the world. Using illustrations to highlight these arguments with my own data from heterosexual, lesbian, gay male, bisexual and transgender counsellors, counselling psychologists and psychotherapists who worked with lesbian and gay male clients, I provide an alternative theoretical perspective. In particular, I aim to show the following: (a) how sexual scripts, in particular hetero sexual scripts, shape the attribution of emotion words; (b) how emotion words are organised according to sexual identity of both sender and recipient; (c) how feelings are framed or organised in the negotiation and attribution of emotion and are synchronised, or in line with, societal and sexual scripts. Through these considerations, it is shown how emotion is shaped through sexual scripts and sexual identity. Finally, I consider the implications of these findings for the meaning of emotion.

24. Emotions and moral mistakes
Petter Nafstad
Philosophy department
University of Tromsø, Norway

It is possible to feel fear, confidence, desire, wrath and pity, generally to feel pleasure and pain too much or too little, which is, in each case, not good. But to feel these things when one ought too, towards the right people, from the right reasons and in the way one ought to, that is the middle and the best and this is exactly what is virtue.
Aristotle (Nic eth)
Admitting emotions a legitimate role in the formation of moral judgements have often been seen as equivalent to emotivism, the position that claims that our moral judgements really are nothing but descriptions of our emotional response to some phenomenon/event. 
Let us admit that there are indeed many moral judgements that really refer to subjective emotional states and only seemingly to objective events. They are really reports of emotional responses. The question now is this: Can such responses be the object of moral evaluation? Can someone (correctly) conceive of the utterance as an expression of an emotional state and evaluate this emotional expression according to a moral standard? Put in a more general way: Is it at all possible to evaluate emotional expressions (and states) according to moral standards? I assume that if the answer to this question is yes the same will hold for the first question. 
In accordance with most deontological ethical theories I will assume that moral judgements are not simply about evaluating some action, but also of evaluating your evaluation of action on the basis of some higher order principle or procedure. A valid ethical judgement is therefore one that has passed a test. The question here is if emotional expressions are put to such ethically relevant tests. 
Now, most proponents of a cognitive conception of emotions would agree that it is possible for emotional responses to contain factual mistakes. I will call this kind of mistakes errors of facts. Errors of facts are possible because emotions imply the presupposition of the truth of some proposition. This presupposition might simply be wrong and the emotional expression judged as such. Such a judgement would however not be a moral one. In this paper I will concentrate on another kind of mistake. I will call these errors of relevance. An error of relevance is one where the emotional response, even though it is based on a true proposition, is in some way inadequate or improper. I will further distinguish between two sorts of relevance-errors, errors of type and errors of degree. What I hope to establish so far is that emotional expressions may be judged to be wrong without reference to the negative truth-value of its implicit proposition. 
The next step will be based on the assumption that emotional expressions have addressees, intended receivers. Such receivers are internalised and idealised as a standard of self-regulation of emotional expressions. (I will here connect to Adams Smith’s idea of “the impartial spectator”). We here have the perspective from which the emotional expressions are evaluated. 
I will then argue that judgements of emotional expressions as mistaken in type or degree (relevance errors) are, in many cases, moral ones. To make this plausible I will have to elaborate some kind of distinction between basic and social emotions and locate possible moral mistakes in this way:

	Basic emotions	Social emotions	
Mistakes of facts	Cognitive mistakes	Cognitive mistakes	
Mistakes of relevance	Pathological mistakes	Moral mistakes	

I will claim that the basis of such judgments will be an intersubjectively assumed asymmetry between the emotional expression and the object of the emotion. I will try to show that this implies that an emotional response that is judged to be symmetrical to the event to which it is a response is accepted as a moral argument and that the question whether or not there is such symmetry should be decided with reference to possible approval from a more general perspective.

25. Philosophical clarity and untrue feelings
Hannes Nykänen
Department of Philosophy
Åbo Akademi University, Finland
 
When a thought is untrue it in some demonstrable way distorts or misses that which it is supposed to be about. There is something in the thought which is illusory: ‘I thought…but nothing happened.’ Feelings seem to be different. When a feeling is untrue there is nothing illusory about it. The untrue feeling is quite as real as the true one. If this is so, with what right does one then speak about ‘untruth’ in connection with feelings? Would it not be better to say that it is the thoughts that go with an ‘untrue’ feeling - such as, say, envy - which are untrue? The envious feelings are what they are while the thoughts connected with them are untrue - would this not be a more cogent way of expressing things? The talk about ‘true feelings’ would then be only a confusion of folk psychology. 
One problem with the above suggestion is that it relies on a particular idea about truth; truth as correspondence. This idea also has consequences for the way one understands feelings. It leads one to think that feelings cannot really be problematic because they simply are what they are. The problems lie only in the realm of thought. This idea can also involve an over-emphasis of the bodily sensations which are thought to be there apart from the thought-content of the feelings. What is the problem with this idea? 
The problem is not only that feelings might be ignored but that they are talked about only in terms of their ‘content’ – for, as one has to admit, there is not much to say about pure sensations. This, further, involves that in philosophising about feelings one simply describes and analyses feelings and the complex ways they can manifest themselves in interpersonal relationships. One talks in terms of feelings but, because ‘thought-content’ is the issue, the logic of the whole discourse is determined by thinking.
What then is the ‘discourse of feelings’? It is the moral dynamics between feelings. ‘Envy’ expresses a difficulty and it constitutes a falling in the face of the difficulty. What is that difficulty? The difficulty is about my love for the person I envy. ‘Love?’ Envy, obviously, is not simply negative. I will argue that most feelings between persons are both positive and negative. Negative feelings are often a withdrawal from love. 
‘Untrue’ feelings express our difficulties with each other. We repress our feelings, create feelings, hide feelings, exaggerate feelings etc. Thus a person may be conscious only of being kind towards another person – nothing more. Still, he might also be patronising and arrogant towards the person, disgusted by him, afraid of him, envious of him, etc. even if he is only indirectly aware of these other feelings - for instance in the form of a characteristic denial. To study the truth and untruth of feeling is to study the dynamics of these feelings; the particular elements of avoidance and love which go with each feeling.
Thinking is not always neutral to the difficulties we have with each other. ‘Being reasonable’ has its own mood which silences feelings. Often it may of course be good to silence feeling and be reasonable but just as often the opposite is the case. Philosophy has not been very good at noticing the importance of the second option. The question is: does philosophy offer a secret shield against the difficult dynamics of feelings? Is philosophy’s traditionally condescending attitude to feelings the other side of an utilisation of the value of ‘being reasonable’ so that the emotionally repressive mood that belongs to ‘being reasonable’ is used, in the name of clarity, to alienate the philosopher from his difficulties with feelings?
The above question can of course be answered only in terms of the picture that philosophy has tended to give of feelings. The purpose of the present paper is to show some characteristic distortions of feelings in philosophy and to give an alternative sketch of the study of feelings.

26. Transcendental guilt: On an emotional condition of moral experience
Sami Pihlström
Department of Philosophy
University of Helsinki, Finland

This paper considers a specific ethically relevant interpersonal emotion, guilt. It is argued that guilt, as a fundamental moral category, has a constitutive role to play in the ways we conceptualize our relations to other people. Without experiencing guilt, or being able to do so, we would not be capable of employing the moral concepts and judgments we do employ. Elaborating on this argument, the paper deals with what may be described as the “metaphysics of guilt”, not primarily with guilt as a psychological concept denoting a (moral) feeling. More generally, it is suggested, through this case study, that a moral theory avoiding naïve emotivism yet emphasizing the role of emotions in morality (cf. Greenspan 1995) can and should pay attention to the transcendental status of emotions such as guilt – emotions that are constitutive of our concept of moral seriousness. However, instead of psychologizing ethical notions, the present paper draws from Raimond Gaita’s (2004) “Wittgensteinian” way of examining the place of the concept of remorse in our ethical language-use. The relation between guilt and remorse will thus also be briefly taken up.
A further meta-level issue is raised through this inquiry. How could a mere emotion, such as guilt or remorse, play a transcendental (constitutive) role as a condition for the possibility of morality (or, generally, of ethical relations to other humans)? Propositions, principles, reasons, judgments, or arguments can be considered transcendental – but can emotions? The dichotomy between emotions and judgments should, however, be critically scrutinized (cf. Wallace 1993), just like the ones between facts and values and between the transcendental and the empirical (Pihlström 2003, 2005). On these grounds, it is argued that a notion such as guilt, or remorse, can have a transcendental status precisely because of its pragmatic functions within the humanly inescapable “language-games” of morality.
Perhaps, ultimately, it is in literature (or art in general) rather than philosophy that the importance of guilt in our relations to others, and the specific role(s) played by this concept in our ethical vocabulary, can be demonstrated. The paper concludes by noting that there are three particularly compelling studies on guilt in the tradition of Western literature: the Book of Job in the Old Testament, Kafka’s Der Prozess, and Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov. Through these works (overlooking their enormous stylistic and cultural differences), moral guilt can be seen as something (lacking a better word) “mystical”, i.e., inexpressible in ordinary language, yet as fundamental and metaphysically irreplaceable in human life, even as a condition for the possibility of experiencing life as meaningful – or for the possibility of experiencing life as something in which the lack of meaning can be considered a genuine lack. The principal contribution of the concept of guilt to moral theory may, then, lie in the way in which it draws our attention to the groundlessness and irreducibility of the ethical: “Why be moral?” is a question that leads us out of morality (as argued in Pihlström 2005), whereas “What have I done?”, like “I am guilty”, is an irreducibly ethical expression of moral commitment.

References
Gaita, R. (2004) Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception, 2nd ed., London & New York: Routledge (1st ed. 1991).
Greenspan, P.S. (1995) Practical Guilt: Moral Dilemmas, Emotions, and Social Norms, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pihlström, S. (2003) Naturalizing the Transcendental: A Pragmatic View, Amherst, NY: Prometheus/Humanity Books.
Pihlström, S. (2005) Pragmatic Moral Realism: A Transcendental Defense, Amsterdam: Rodopi (forthcoming).
Wallace, K. (1993) “Reconstructing Judgment: Emotion and Moral Judgment”, Hypatia 8:3, 61-83.

27. Reason, passions and will in Mary Wollstonecraft’s conception of moral motivation
Martina Reuter
Department of Philosophy
University of Helsinki, Finland

Mary Wollstonecraft has received reputation as an early feminist, writer and radical advocate of the French revolution. She wrote, collected and translated novels, moral stories for children, travel letters, political pamphlets, approximately 420 book reviews, published in the journal Analytical Review, and hundreds of private letters. None of these texts are clear-cut philosophical treatises, but they unambiguously attribute her the title of enlightenment philosophe. 
There has been relatively little research on Wollstonecraft’s originality as a philosophical thinker and when it has been done, the focus has been on her political thought. The question of her originality is not easily solved. Wollstonecraft’s writings are good, not to say paradigmatic, examples of how philosophical ideas are picked up, combined and transformed in intellectual culture at large and they provide us with a possibility to study how different literary genres interpret, affect and develop philosophical ideas. Her combination of ideas is unsystematic, eclectic and unafraid of contradictions. The question of originality has to be answered by finding and examining the philosophical intuitions and aims that are guiding her mixture of philosophical elements.
In this paper I intend to examine in what sense Wollstonecraft’s understanding of the relation between reason and passion can claim originality and whether it can be considered as philosophically consistent. I will focus on how this relation appears in the context of her conception of moral motivation. Wollstonecraft strongly emphasises that truth is the foundation of human rights as well as virtues and reason, by its capacity to know the truth, has a constitutive role in virtue. On the other hand, her moral psychology shares many features with Hume’s thought and she strongly emphasises that not only our capacity to act, but also our capacity to think, is intrinsically dependent on the passions.
The most peculiar feature in Wollstonecraft’s philosophical thought is the almost complete absence of a discussion of the role of the will. Her conception of liberty presupposes a free will, but she does not conceptualise how the will works or how it is related to reason and the passions. At the beginning of A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792) Wollstonecraft describes the relations between truth, reason, knowledge, virtue and the passions, but she does not mention the will. As a conclusion of these relations she writes “the perfection of our nature and capability of happiness, must be estimated by the degree of reason, virtue, and knowledge, that distinguish the individual, and direct the laws which bind society: and that from the exercise of reason, knowledge and virtue naturally flow, is equally undeniable, if mankind be viewed collectively”. I will approach the question of Wollstonecraft’s conception of moral motivation by interpreting how she thinks that “knowledge and virtue naturally flow” from the exercise of reason.
Wollstonecraft develops her most elaborate discussion of the will in a review of Catharine Macaulay’s Letters on Education (1790), published in the Analytical Review (November 1790). Here Wollstonecraft agrees with Macaulay’s view that moral necessity, the existence of a strong moral motivation, does not contradict the free will. Regarding matters of style Macaulay’s Letters on Education is different from anything Wollstonecraft wrote. It is a systematic treatise on the different aspects of education, which presents extensive remarks on philosophical and theological topics and grounds the views on education presented in an elaborated metaphysics of the mind. Wollstonecraft’s Vindication of the Rights of Woman is heavily indebted to Macaulay’s Letters on Education, where one can find the basis of almost all Wollstonecraft’s philosophical ideas.
By comparing Macaulay’s and Wollstonecraft’s views, I will argue that the latter’s originality consists primarily in her stronger emphasis on the passionate nature of reason. This emphasis is not systematically articulated, but has to be traced to Wollstonecraft’s views on the imagination and fiction. Here I will be following a line of thought which has been initiated by Karen Green and Barbara Taylor.

28. Others and perfection in Leibniz
Markku Roinila
Department of Philosophy
University of Helsinki, Finland

In Leibniz's metaphysics the windowless monads do not interact directly with each other. The relations between them are defined in creation by God's with the pre-established harmony. Yet in Leibniz's moral philosophy great importance is attached to social virtues such as justice and charity. These virtues are based on emotions, which are the main motivational forces in his practical rationality. 
According to Leibniz, the pleasure of the mind consists of perceiving goodness or experiencing a feeling of perfection or joy. Perfection is perceived as some kind of order or harmony. Pleasure is also activity, since the increase of perfection is identical with activity. According to Leibniz, activity brings pleasure and passivity brings pain. The more distinctly a substance perceives, the more active it is. The passive substance has in proportion more confused than clear perceptions in cognition and less perfection. The more active one is, the more one attains joy and the more one's feeling of perfection is increased. 
The egoistic striving for joy is complemented by theories of love and justice, which define the relations between human beings. According to Leibniz, one should do good to everyone, since this is the way the agent's own intellectual pleasures are increased. When one does good to someone else, he or she senses the increase of perfection in the world and gets pleasure out of the other person’s happiness. This pleasure is love and consequently, he or she loves the other person. By this manner egoism and altruism can be combined. 
A more social dimension of love is Leibniz’s version of the golden rule, which he calls la place d’autruy, the place of other. Leibniz argues that we should put ourselves, or to imagine ourselves in the place of the other. As a result we can perceive the perfection in others, which gives us pleasure and creates love in us. Leibniz uses the principle as a heuristic device, which improves our understanding of moral philosophy and justice. 
Leibniz tried to show that there is reason for complaint not only when one is harmed by another, but also when one is not helped to obtain a great good by another who could do so without a significant loss to himself. This idea forms the basis of Leibniz's conception of justice, which is defined as the habit of loving as long as it is in accordance with wisdom. Put otherwise: Caritas sapientas, charity or love practiced by a wise man. Justice is a rational activity for the common good – it is to live virtuously. Thus maintenance of other people's well-being, which is based on love, is a medium for the increasing universal perfection, which again creates pleasure in us. 

29. ‘Now is a time for simplicity’
On the possibility of compassion without identification
Mariëtte Willemsen
Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

In the history of philosophy due attention has been paid to compassion. Philosophers who have shown interest in this emotion differ from each other in the evaluation of its moral worth. On the one hand, we find those who reject compassion and consider it to be of no moral value. Plato, Kant and Nietzsche are examples of this stance. On the other hand, we find those who greatly esteem this emotion, stressing its moral importance. Aristotle, Rousseau, Schopenhauer and Simone Weil are representatives of this point of view. Schopenhauer even holds that compassion is the fundament of ethics.
In contemporary philosophy the interest in compassion has continued. And it seems that the advocates of this emotion are gaining ground. To mention just two examples: Iris Murdoch, building upon Simone Weil, regards compassion as a key-notion in moral philosophy; Martha Nussbaum, taking Aristotle’s analysis of compassion as a point of departure, spends some 150 pages of her Upheavals of Thought elaborating on this emotion and its moral significance.
Nevertheless, the moral worth of compassion is still not beyond dispute. The main objection to compassion (raised by Nietzsche) is that a person impelled by compassion pretends to connect the self to the other, but in reality is just fantasising, projecting her own thoughts and feelings onto the other. As a result, the other is not reached at all. 
In my contribution to the conference, I want to concentrate on this objection. To what extent can we charge compassionate people with selfishness? What is the role of identification, empathy, ‘in his shoes imagining’ (cf. Peter Goldie) in situations of compassion? Are they necessary for compassion to come into existence?
In the second part of the workshop (the discussion part) I would like to present three situations of compassion, all of them taken from Wit (a film by Mike Nichols (2001) based on the play by Margaret Edson (1999)). In interaction with those present I want to evaluate these situations, wondering what makes us think we are dealing with compassion in the given cases and wondering how much identification, empathy or fantasy is involved.
My conclusion will be that the purest and morally most praiseworthy form of compassion is one in which the role of identification is minimised. To reach this conclusion I will point to ideas brought forward by Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch.
The structure of my Workshop will be:
Compassion in the history of philosophy: advocates and opponents 
Contemporary evaluations of compassion
Main objection against compassion
Three situations of compassion (film Wit)
Conclusion: compassion without identification.

III. LOVE

30. On loving persons for their own sake
Heikki Ikäheimo
Department of Philosophy
University of Jyväskylä, Finland

According to what Aristotle sees as the core meaning of philia, loving someone is caring for her good or well-being for her own sake. In his article ‘Reasons of Love’ Robert R. Solomon criticizes a particular reading of this ‘for her own sake’, according to which it means ‘independently of her properties’. He asks, what is left in the loved one to love when all her properties have been removed: a naked, propertyless soul, a queer Kantian loved an sich (p.7), a dubious personal essence or some such (p. 20)?
Solomon deems this reading of the ‘for her own sake’, as also the related idea that love is “unconditional”, as “romantic nonsense”. To overcome this “misguided ontology that wreaks havoc in discussions of love” Solomon then proposes another reading of ‘for her own sake’. According to this reading it refers to relational or “Aristophanic” properties which makes the loved one a suitable partner for the lover. ‘For her own sake’ thus means roughly ‘because we fit together well’.
I argue (1) that the whole problem which Solomon want’s to avoid with his relational-property-reading of ‘for her own sake’ is mis-construed, and (2) that Solomon’s solution to this mis-construed problem has counterintuitive consequences, which can be avoided by a reading of ‘for her own sake’ which Solomon ignores.
	That is, (1) whether we see love as directed to the loved person as an instantiation of irrelational properties or relational properties (as Solomon does), or as stripped of all her properties, we are seeing love as directed to the loved one as an object. I propose that both of these alternatives are false, and that the elusive ‘for her own sake’ refers to the loved person exactly not as an object, but as a subject. In this regard love is like the Kantian respect: both are attitudes of relating to a person as a subject and not (at least merely) as an object.
	Yet, respect and love relate to different dimensions of the subjectivity of the respected or loved person: respect to her reason or power of judgement, and love to her capacity for happiness and misery. Whereas respect is acknowledging the claims of someone’s being a rational creature, love is being moved by someones capacity for happiness or misery, or by her ‘eudaimonistic vulnerability’. In other words, loving is simply caring for someones happiness or well-being without any reasons, such as those based on the objective – irrelational or relational – properties of the loved one.
	(2) Solomons notion of ‘fit’ or of the right kind of relational properties seems too vague to rule out that the relationship of the most pathological sadist and the most pathological masochist would be a love relationship – after all, there is a perfect fit. I find it extremely counterintuitive to call a relationship of absolute cruelty and degradation a love-relationship. Perhaps Solomon too, but the question is why exactly? On which criteria or definition would this not be a love-relation? The most obvious candidate for an answer is: because it lacks genuine caring for the well-being or happiness of the other for her sake, or in other words, because it lacks love.
	Finally, to meet the common objection, that this simple notion of love is too simple or rigid for conceiving the lived complexity of love-relations, I argue the exact opposite. We need to distinguish between (a) the endless multitude of phenomena involved in the histories of concrete human relationships, (b) the complex and changing constellations of attitudes that persons in the various stages of concrete relationships have towards each other, and (c) single attitudes like that of love. What makes a concrete human relationship a love-relationship is the attitude of love, not for instance living together, having sex, having children, having a long history together or making a perfect fit.

31. Kierkegaard on passions of faith and love
Janne Kylliäinen
University of Helsinki, Finland

In Kierkegaard’s conception of subjectivity central place is occupied by “Lidenskab”, passion. Passions are connected with possibilities and with the tension between the possible and actual. In the aesthetic sphere erotic seduction awakes vague images and anticipations in the one seduced; the possibilities anticipated excite and arouse erotic passion and anxieties. As long as the possibilities are still open, the passions shoot up high. In the ethical sphere the ethical individual becomes passionate when he reads on noble deeds and anticipates that he too could realise such human possibilities in his own existence. A genuine ethical passion, then, aims at transforming the actual self into the ideal self. In the religious sphere the idea of eternal blessedness makes the religious person passionate and in the Christian sphere the passion of faith transforms the existence of the subject thoroughly.
To analyse and explicate the connections that Kierkegaard makes between the elements of subjectivity such as passions, emotions, will, imagination, character, and faith is a complicated task. In my paper I will concentrate on the Christian passions of faith and neighbour love and on their relationship to the ideal of equality.
Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Johannes Climacus claims that human understanding has certain limits that cannot be transcended by disinterested reflection: with thought alone the subject remains undecided on the nature of the unknown and its relationship to the known reality. Our conception of the unknown is thus settled only through the passion of faith. According to the Christian view as presented by Climacus, the unknown reveals itself in Christ but there is a strong emotional defence in human beings against receiving this revelation. The natural reaction of human beings is to become offended on the idea of the eternal God suffering in the world and dying as a humble human being. Only if the passion of faith gains an upper hand over against the opposite passion of offence, is the eternal truth on God and his relationship to the world accepted.
For the right kind of understanding to arise, equality must be achieved between God and man. Equality is demanded by the love God has for single human beings. Equality is also what God commands us to practice in love: in front of God all human beings are equal, therefore we ought to love without making differences between them. In this love of one’s neighbour opposes the natural love which is always love of preference, that is, hidden self-love. 
The passion of faith opens up a transcendent reality and reforms the passion of love that resides in human beings. The reformed passion of love reforms also the way human beings relate to each other and is the basis for genuine equality. – It turns out that universality based on the passion of love is more universal than the universality based on unbiased reason: a Christian loves his neighbour even while, from the natural, human point of view, there are good reasons against it.

32. Duty to love
Arto Laitinen
University of Jyväskylä, Finland

Can there be duties, or ’oughts’ or ‘reasons’ to love, or care? If there is, do they concern only actions (as Kant suggested) or also love as an emotion, deep concern or motivational force? I will argue there are duties, oughts and reasons to love also in the latter sense, and that they are not limited to special relationships, but include (dispositions to have) emotions towards strangers. There seem to be various obstacles on the way of such a view. I will discuss three.
First, emotions are not fully in our control. Oughts and reasons imply ‘can’. Thus, there seems to be no ought or reason to have any emotions, including love or care or deep concern for the other for her own sake. At most there is reason to try.
Second, loving concern manifests itself in spontaneous responses to the other’s plights, and the attitude of love is supposed to be caring for the other for the other person’s sake. Is not the nature of love as spontaneous, or as “for the other’s sake” compromised or spoilt if we add such things as duties, reasons or oughts? To deliberate about reasons, or to do φ because one ought to, or to act out of sense of duty sounds like a wrong sort of thing.
 	Finally, is not ‘love’ or ‘care’ limited to special relationships (such as loving one’s partner, or friends, or one’s children)? It seems to make no sense to ask whom a “phronimos” would or ought to love, and it is not realistic to assume we could have warm loving face-to-face relationships with everyone.
 I will argue that what is true in these three worries is compatible with our having a duty to love, or reasons to have emotions. 
First obstacle: Emotions are not fully in our control. Oughts and reasons imply ‘can’. Thus, there seems to be no ought or reason to have any emotions, including love or care or deep concern for the other for her own sake. At most there is reason to try.
Reply: There can be reasons for things which are not fully in our control, we cannot simply decide to have beliefs either and there are reasons for beliefs (And like beliefs, emotions are to some extent under our control). Our ‘cognitive responses’ and ‘emotional responses’ can be responses for genuinely or merely apparently reason-giving features. The can be more or less fitting, appropriate, adequate etc. The responses ought to be appropriate, or, we ought to be such that we respond adequately. 
Furthermore, if we grant that oughts and reasons imply ‘can’, we can stipulate that there are ‘demands’ and ‘calls’ which do not imply ‘can’. The demand to do what I promised remains at place even while I am contingently unable to do it, or the ‘call’ of a good concert remains at place even though it is sold out and I can’t go there. The demands and calls of love and care may well remain at place even though I am contingently, temporarily unable to respond. (Creatures such as stones which are necessarily unable to respond face no demands). 
I will further distinguish duties as relations which have 4 places from the reason-, ought-, demand-, and call-relations which have 3 places. 
 R [p, A, φ] reads “p is a reason for A to φ”
	 (“calls” are just ‘can’-insensitive reasons)
 O [p, A, φ] reads “A ought to φ, because of the ought-making fact (set of facts) p”
	 (“demands” are just ‘can’-insensitive oughts)
 D [p, A, B, φ] reads “A has a duty to φ, towards B, because of the fact p which grounds the duty” 
 “Because of p, A owes it to B that A φ”
 If there are duties towards oneself, then A=B. Conceptually it is possible that even though A ought to care about B, A does not have a duty (B does not have a right) that A care about B. This is an interpersonal conception of rights and duties.
 
Whether there is a reason to try is a separate issue. If a concert is sold out, I have no longer a reason to try. If I face all the evidence it seems misleading to say I have reason to try to believe. It is misleading, because I can satisfy the demand to try and yet my beliefs are not as they ought to be. But if we call ‘virtuous’ a person who is such that responds adequately, it may be true that the strong-willed, weak-willed and vicious ought to try to become virtuous. Thus, ‘duty/demand/call to love’ may be a special case of the duty/demand/call to be virtuous. 
Second, loving concern manifests itself in spontaneous responses to the other’s plights, and the attitude of love is supposed to be caring for the other for the other person’s sake. Is not the nature of love as spontaneous, or as “for the other’s sake” compromised or spoilt if we theorize such things as duties, reasons or oughts? To deliberate about reasons, or to do φ because one ought to, or to act out of sense of duty sounds like a wrong kind of thing.
Reply: One may respond to reasons ‘spontaneously’ without deliberating, one can be directly moved by what is the ground of duty (say, obstacle to the other person’s well-being) without feeling any ‘sense of duty’. One’s habitual responses to features of the world are in the virtual control of one’s ratiocinative capacities, if one’s responses seem wrong. But absent deviant responses (say, over-reacted disgust at Uncle George sucking his teeth), one can go on spontaneously, relying on one’s emotional responses.
To act for the other person’s sake is always to respond to ‘a reason’ in the sense of a feature of the situation which favours or calls for certain kind of act. ‘Reasons’ in such a sense have no specific connection to the ‘faculty of reason’ as opposed to ‘faculty of emotions’, or better put, emotions are in the business of disclosing such reasons. Emotions disclose relevant features of situations.
What the phrase “for her sake” means can be analysed in terms of motivational patterns and in terms of normative relations. I will make only a couple of comments on that. 
And, the “duty to love” (in the sense with goes beyond mere acts) concerns one’s motivational or emotional patterns in a broad sense. To be in the loving state is to be sensitive to certain features as reasons. The general requirement to be in that state (the duty to love) is a different one from the specific requirements. There is a general requirement (perhaps a duty towards oneself?) to be virtuous, and have the right kind of motivational set, but a duty to love
 Finally, is not ‘love’ or ‘care’ limited to special relationships (such as loving one’s partner, or friends, or one’s children)? It makes no sense to ask whom a “phronimos” would or ought to love.
 	Reply: It is indeed possible that one’s motivations and states are as they ought to be, but one just has no friends, children or partner. People can be lonely. “The duty to love” is not a duty to be in a position where one has friends, children and partner. 
Special relationships come with special duties to love. (and ‘phronimoi’ certainly would love their children). Indeed, ‘duty’ to love may concern only children. They have needs, and are entitled to have their needs met. Their needs are not merely biological but emotional. They need loving interactions. 
I tend to think that although it is sad that there are lonely adults, no-one has strictly speaking a duty to form friendships with them. However, there is a reason or call for anyone to indeed to form such a friendship, but it may be disabled by the people’s already having too many friends and so on. This means also that everyone is ‘worthy of love’. The stringency of a reason depends of course on the context.
Finally, there is a general reason to care about anyone, and respond emotionally or sympathetically to anyone’s plight. This does not presuppose any special relationship. If one wishes, one can call this a general love of humankind (or maybe any sentient beings).

33. Knowing me, knowing you: on love and knowing emotion
Michael Lacewing
Heythrop College
University of London, U.K.

‘Psychoanalysis is in essence a cure through love.’ 
- Sigmund Freud
‘Love is knowledge of the individual.’
- Iris Murdoch

Staying in touch with psychological, emotional reality – both one’s own and that of other people – is a continuous task. Psychoanalysis argues that we have a constant tendency, particularly in the face of painful experiences, to unconsciously pervert our experience of reality by imagining it to be different. This is rarely clearer than in our personal relationships. For example, I might deny that I am envious or resentful of your success, and so not recognise the angry barb in my comment that life comes easily to you. We imagine ourselves not to have emotions and desires that in fact we do, or we might tell ourselves that they are not as important or significant as they are. Or we experience other people differently from how they are, believing they have feelings or desires that in fact they do not. We can even mistakenly attribute our own feelings to them. I might experience you as needy and dependent when in fact I need things to be arranged just so, so that I feel independent. All this ignorance, misattribution and self-deception is itself driven by our emotions, which are, very often, unconscious.
This paper argues that there is a deep connection between our knowledge of the emotional lives of ourselves and others and the emotional attitude we take to those lives. Emotional knowledge depends on a particular emotional state. Freud found that when we can come to acknowledge our emotions and desires as they really are, this leads to a better, truer, less perverse relationship with ourselves and with others. Our perversion of our emotional lives is typically the result of emotions or desires we cannot accept in ourselves because of the pain they cause. In order to achieve knowledge of ourselves and the emotions of others, we first need to understand and accept our emotions, including the ones that prevent this understanding and acceptance, for what they are. This leads to a transformation in our emotional lives, both individually and in community with others.
But how is that this step can be taken? It is, at its core, a psychological development, a transformation of our emotional stance towards our own desires and emotions. Rejection of our desires and emotions needs to be replaced by a sympathetic understanding, an acceptance that we do, in fact, feel this way. The emotions that drive our distortions develop from perversions of reality into an expression of something true and important and in so doing becomes integrated into the self rather than being a threat to the self. In psychoanalysis, the analyst presents patients with a loving acceptance of the desires and emotions that patients have alienated themselves from. This is not an endorsement of those desires and emotions, but a message that it is okay, understandable, to feel that way, that the patient is still lovable. They express the sympathetic understanding of these desires and emotions that the patient later takes up.
Through love, therefore, we come to a better understanding of emotional reality; in the first instance, this is the reality of who we are, what we want and feel, but then also, because our experience of others is now less clouded by our attempts not to recognise ourselves, we become more in touch with the emotional reality of others. And so, the paper argues, love points us in the direction of reality; to love is to be able to know what is real, at least in the world of emotion.
In presenting this argument, the paper will consider and respond to a number of objections to the central claim, for example, that love famously obscures our vision of reality, and that people without love or knowledge of their own emotions may nevertheless have knowledge of others’ emotions (the case of the perceptive sadist). 

34. Love and respect
Kate Larson
Department of Philosophy
Uppsala University, Sweden

In this paper I would like to discuss the phenomena of love, of Eros (as in Plato), i.e. passionate love and how it stands in regard to the more morally charged concept of respect. Iris Murdoch usually although ambiguously treats erotic love and the happening of falling in love as a way to the good, as the (dramatic) discovery of otherness. Her concept of love and her interest in the abovementioned “falling in love” has its origin in the Platonic Eros. Critique has been raised against the Platonic view of love, as portrayed foremost in the Symposium and the Phaedrus. A classical critique by the scholar Vlastos has been refined by Martha Nussbaum and travels in her critical essays over to Murdoch’s thought.
When Murdoch herself discusses and, in her novels, depicts the drama of falling in love, its main ambiguity is the opposite of its achievement: the momentous revelation of otherness it offers is not only the joy of it but a threat to the lover’s own reality and self. Love can thus occasion its own counteraction; the will to devour the beloved, his/hers separate and free existence. Murdoch is in this influenced by Plato’s discussion of Beauty but also by Simone Weil’s interpretation of it which equates love with contemplation, and at its uttermost with self-effacement. Weil often regarding love juxtaposes the metaphors of eating and looking and there hardly seems to be a middle way between them.
	It seems then that although highly philosophically potent erotic love only points to the good and is ultimately a dead end which severs the connection between love and respect. 
	Interestingly Nussbaum’s critique takes another route and honours erotic love with the full knowledge of the individual which the purified love of the “looking” cannot achieve. 
I would like to further asses the critique raised against the Platonic Eros and hopefully to question some of Nussbaum’s points in her reading of Murdoch. The implicit respect in the erotic sensation of the other, that Nussbaum highlights, is perhaps more problematic than she suggests and is, I would assert, positively pictured by Murdoch.

35. Learning to see what is important: love and virtue
(Reflections on a theme from Plato's Symposium)
Ivars Neiders
University of Latvia, Latvia

In this paper I advance and explore the thesis that love may be considered as an important starting-point for virtues; it does not mean that it is the only way to become moral or that being in love amounts to being virtuous. Rather my claim is that, as (i) to love is in a way easier or more natural than to be moral and (ii) as there are important similarities between love and morality as the two varieties of caring, (iii) love may serve as a guide to virtue. My argument deals with (ii) and (iii) and not with (i) as I treat the later to be obvious enough. Consequently my account consists of two parts where both theses are elaborated in order. In constructing my account I use materials from the famous passage in Plato's Symposium where Socrates is instructed in the 'ways of love' (ta erotika) by Diotima. I do not intend to give an interpretation of the Plato's text because the use of the material is rather selective; nevertheless, I think that there is a reason to say that the position is still platonic in general.
To be virtuous is to see certain situations in a particular light, i.e. to be able to perceive some salient features of situations and to be motivated to act according to the requirements of virtue. According to this view a virtue is a complex perceptual capacity which supplies the agent with certain ends, emotions, reasons and desires. The same account may be given for many varieties of love; and I suggest that Plato's concept of generic love could be better understood as a complex set of beliefs, desires and motivations that guides the agent's perceptions and choices, i.e., determines what the agent sees as important. 
Love and virtues usually supply us with (1) the other-regarding desires and reasons and (2) the final ends. Both features are important for my argument; the first helps us to attain more objective and selfless viewpoint, while the second creates a relatively independent frame of reasons for justification. These considerations make reasonable the platonic claim about the role of love in moral progress. However, there are some elements in the Plato's presentation of the moral development that may seem untenable; it is assumed that Plato relies on (1) the conceptual connection between beauty and goodness, (2) egoistic conception of erotic love, and (3) the metaphysical conception of the good. I argue, first, that in the case (1) and (3) an account along platonic lines may actually succeed without these assumptions and second, in the case (2) that this is a wrong and unnecessary reading of Plato.   

36. Love as a paradigm case of emotion
Heleen J. Pott
Erasmus University Rotterdam & Maastricht University

Is love an emotion? Some philosophers have suggested that love is so complex, incorporating expectations, long term patterns of social interaction and cultural sanctions, that it should not be thought of as an emotion but as an attitude or a conative state. Other philosophers pointed out, however, that love is based on an appraisal, a belief that someone is desirable. Since it is a common feature that the intentionality of emotions depends on beliefs, they see love as an emotion, although an anomalous one. 
Anomalous for example because people are said to fall in and out of love, as they are not said to fall in and out of anger, fear, or other emotions. The reasons why a person falls out of love are no clearer to the agent than the reasons why he or she fell in love. The explanation of the difference seems to lie not in the varying intensity of particular feelings that we display, but in the small role that the element of belief need play in the process of falling in love. While most emotions have a more or less firm, belief-based rationality, love is based on a act of imagination that seems almost nonrational. Stendhal compared it to a process of 'crystallization'. If you throw a branch from a shrub into the Salzburg mines and retrieve it the following day, it appears transformed. The plain botanical form has been covert with iridecent crystals which exquisitely embroider its surface. According to Stendhal, a similar process occurs in a soul capable of love. 
Because of this non-rational crystallization, falling in love resembles the onset of hunger or sexual desire in not requiring the agent to hold any specific beliefs about the person, except that he or she is a fitting object of the agent's desire. Love may remain, although the intended partner turns out to be unavailable. Erotic love can be an obsession that cannot be exorcised, but constantly reappears in new incarnations. 
And so, in the process, the agent becomes a patient, he or she is overcome by an obsessive desire for the object. Love frequently gets out of control. It can get us into difficulties in all sorts of ways. We are susceptible to react in ways which undermine our own interests. Erotic love is often thought of as a negative emotion from an ethical point of view, not only because it seems so irrational, but also because it involves treating the loved one as a possession. 
Love, then, is in many ways a passion. In my paper I will argue that the powerlessness and passivity that are part of the imaginative process of falling in love, make love not an anomalous emotion, as philosophers often say, but its paradigm case. I will show that the conceptual apparatus used by currently dominant theories of emotion fails to understand these typical aspects of love, and develop an account of love that rectifies certain problems in current emotion philosophy. 

IV. EMOTIONS AND RELIGION
37. Wittgenstein, emotions and the human form of life
Steen Brock
Institut for Filosofi
Aarhus Universitet, Denmark

"According to Wittgenstein´s analysis in his Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, emotions are integrated with a set of other features of concious action, forming part of the kind of synthetic unity that Wittgenstein calls "experiences". I want to argue that this analysis provides a new basis for formulating and discussing a range of important dimensions of the human form of life. In particular I will illustrate a way to regard an individual human life as a life including an awareness of one´s own death and a variety of attitudes towards the possible death of others. This, I will argue, is also relevant for a special understanding of religious belief that I think comes cross in Wittgensteins works"

38. The human self, identification and the instability of religious interpretation – reflections on some problems with a cognitive approach to the study of religiosity
TD Peter Nynäs
Åbo Akademi University and NTNU
Åbo, Finland - Trondheim, Norway

Cognitive approaches to religion and religiosity have gained much scholarly interest lately and this interest seems to be growing. E.g Pascal Boyers work Religion explained is widely recognized. One of his main ideas  - shortly summarized - is that religiosity prevails due to the fact that several cognitive systems implicitly relay on the idea of an existing God, i.e. the cognitive element ‘God’ is implicitly embedded in other cognitive systems. In the paper I reflect on how the human self is conceived in cognitive approaches in comparison with psychoanalytically oriented approaches as a means to discuss the fruitfulness of a cognitive approach to religiosity.
In the Victorian age the concept of a human self was used as a means to conceptualize individuals in their depths and it was still recognized by William James in his division between the me-self and the I-self, the latter (the self as knower) more or less out of reach due to its evasiveness. Later, as a result of the dominant trend of functionalist behaviorism the concept of a human self was not considered until it gained new interest in the 1960’s. In the new scientific context of cognitive research the human self was understood in a new way. The main metaphor of the human self became the machine and, later on inspired by the new technology, the computer and its software. Rationality and autonomy became key features of the self.
In the paper I argue that a cognitive approach easily ends up reducing our understanding of religiosity as it does not acknowledge the complexity of the self. By complexity I here refer to the unstable processes typical to human interpretation (and atypical to the metaphor of computer software). Characteristic to religious interpretation is that the central agent of meaning is emotional embeddedness in identification with real and symbolic others. Therefore, a psychoanalytically oriented understanding of the self corresponds better with the study of religiosity. It acknowledges the human communicative dependency of and vulnerability to self-other relationships. A key feature of the self is identification and relatedness, not rationality or autonomy.
My paper deals with two different representations of the human self and their abilities to shed light on human religiosity. The paper relates to an on-going qualitative study of reception of religious communication. The interplay between the human self and interpretative processes are of great analytical relevance in this study.

39. I am you when I am myself: The concept of mutuality in recent German philosphy and Christian mysticism
Iris Wikström
Åbo Akademi University, Finland

The influence of Christian mysticism on subject philosophy has recently been discussed by some German philosophers, i.e. Katrin Bederna (2004) and Saskia Wendel (2002). The main concern of the former is the danger in modern social politics of reducing the individual to a member of a certain collective or a number of statistics. From a philosophical point of view Bederna rejects the static cogito presented by Descartes and considers the self an acting, sensuously determined human being, who is formed by the interaction with other persons. The self takes shape by approaching other human beings  and by receiving the response of this approach. Referring to Paul Ricoeur Bederna considers the self (ipse) presented by the two ‘pretranscendental’ mystics Angela da Foligno and Caterina Fieschi da Genova. I will here continue this discussion with reference especially to the idea of a subject philosophy presented by the German philosopher Nicholas of Cusa (1401-64) in the last chapter of his work De coniecturis II. I will primarily consider the concept of mutuality, i.e. the relation between the self and the Other in which the identity of the self is formed. It could be assumed that mutuality is determined primarily by universal absolute intentionality and hence only an indirect matter, considered from a human point of view. However, this precondition does not make this concept less essential. The case is rather the opposite.   
V. EMOTIONS AND ART
40. Music and Ontological Security
Kathleen Marie Higgins
Department of Philosophy
The University of Texas at Austin, USA

One of the bases for a connection between music and emotion is music’s capacity to establish and reinforce a sense of ontological security.  Drawing on but modifying the definition of R. D. Laing, I define ontological security as a person’s “centrally firm sense” that he or she has the same ontological status as other people.  In other words, the person senses that he or she occupies the same order of being as other people and shares the encountered world with them.  
Recognizing music’s relationship to ontological security enables us to understand of certain perplexing features of music.  First, music’s relationship to ontological security suggests explanations of several perplexing features of music.  First, it explains why we value in music repetition to a degree that would be intolerable in most other artistic media.  Repetition in music is conducive to confidence in the stability of basic patterns that one has come to expect, thereby promoting the sense that change is in a largely predictable context. 
Second, music’s role in connection with ontological security explains why certain “basic” emotions predominate in discussions of the music-emotion relationship, even though the range of emotions conveyed by music is extremely broad.  The emotions that often tend to be associated with music are emotions that relate to a basic sense of security in an intersubjective world.
Third, music’s ability to produce and reinforce a sense of ontological security enables us to recognize some truth in each of the several theories of the relationship between music and emotion that have been proposed.  The alternative theories – that music imitates or represents emotion, that it arouses emotion, and that it expresses emotion – each suggest a particular way for a person to relate to music.  Imitation/representation theory suggests a detached point of view, in which a listener recognizes similarities between features of music and features of emotional experience.  At the same time, such similarities, strongly suggest how music is able to arouse emotion, for example, through producing patterns of physiological stimulation that resembles patterns that occur in everyday emotional experience.  Music can arouse emotion in listeners who are engaging with music in a less detached manner that enables more direct identification with the music’s movement.  Expression theory has often been articulated in terms that divorce the expression from any person whose emotion is being expressed; but the point of view that expression suggests is that of the performer/composer, not necessarily understood as a particular individual but as one who is occupying a particular role in relation to the music.  Proposals to the effect that music reflects the psychological experience of a persona reflect this aptly, although some theorists attempt too much characterization of the persona as a distinct person, defeating the usefulness of the concept.
Efforts to adjudicate among these theories ignore a possibility that is enabled by music’s relationship to ontological security.  On the basis of a sense of ontological security, one is able to relate to the music in a fluid way, moving back and forth between the extremes of feeling identified with the music and taking an analytic approach to music as an object.  Thus, one is able to relate to music at times as an object that can be compared to emotional structures, but at times to engage in emotional identification with music, or with a persona expressing emotions, to which one may have an emotional response.

41. Hearing human emotions in music — how is it possible?
Elina Packalén
Department of Philosophy
Turku University, Finland

Emotions have recently been a central topic on many branches of study, including musicology, psychology of music and philosophy of music. In the philosophical discussion of music and emotions the focus has been mainly on the question of how music can be expressive of emotions. For instance, we often describe music as joyous or melancholy, but these terms refer to such states of mind that only living and sentient subjects can have: what is thus the basis of these emotive descriptions of music?
If the emotions that music is heard to be expressive of are some special aesthetic emotions, then the meaning of ordinary emotion terms is ambiguous. This problem is avoided if expressivity of music is related to the primary case of expression, namely to human expression of emotions. However, as Stephen Davies has noted, there are two kinds of uses of emotion terms even when they are applied to humans: firstly, assigning to humans of such emotions that they are thought to feel, and secondly, describing humans by emotion terms that refer rather to the behavior and appearance of a person (e.g. a sad-looking face). In this latter case there are no implications about the emotions that this person may actually feel.
The recent theories of expression in music have made use of these both ways of assigning emotion terms to persons. I will focus on Derek Matravers’s, Peter Kivy’s and Laird Addis’s theories; these accounts represent arousalist, cognitivist and symbolist theories of expression in music, respectively. In arousalist views of expression the importance of how humans feel emotions is emphasized whereas in identifying the emotive character of music cognitivists lay stress on emotive appearance and human ways of expressing emotions.    
I am going to consider the question of whether perceiving a kind of similarity between events of music and human expressive gesture and behavior is sufficient for hearing expressivity in music. Or does hearing expressivity presuppose an experience of expressivity, and what does this kind of experience consist of? In these experiences Matravers has stressed the role of feelings aroused by music because even in the case of other persons’ expression of emotions we always react emotively. On the other hand, if this assumption about the aroused feelings turns out to be too generalized, what else could explain our tendency to hear emotions in music? Addis has responded to this problem by suggesting that music symbolizes our mental states, including emotions. In this view Addis has leaned on Susanne Langer’s idea that music is isomorphic with the form of our emotions, which, however, is problematic.  

42. Painting, emotion and expression
Ben Tilghman
Kansas State University, USA

Painters during the renaissance were concerned with what they called expression, that is, the representation of the emotions of the figures in their paintings. Expression was a problem for them because they tended to think of emotion as inner or private. The solution was to represent emotion by displaying the physiognomy and movements of the figures in the painting. The reductio absurdum of this was Charles LeBrun’s claim that each emotion had a unique facial expression. The mistakes in all of this serve to remind us of the conceptual connections between emotion, action and circumstances. And then there is the romantic theory that art is the emotional expression of the artist; a view which is fraught with its own confusions.
VI. EMOTIONS AND INTENTIONALITY 

43. A special way of being afraid: death, emotions, others  
Kathy Behrendt
New College, Oxford, U.K.

Much work in philosophy of the emotions has come down to some degree against viewing emotions as private, passive and wholly natural.  There is a widespread view that emotions are (at least in part if not fundamentally) cognitive, involving belief states and having intentional objects.  A prevalent corollary to this approach has it that we acquire and develop our emotional conceptual repertoire socially, under the influence and tutelage of others.  And emerging from this contextualist account is the idea that we initially become acquainted with these concepts not propositionally but through exposure to scenarios with a narrative structure (what de Sousa calls “paradigm scenarios”, glossed by him as “little dramas in which our natural capacities for emotional response were first enlisted”).
One criticism of the contextualist view of the emotions is that it appears erroneously to treat emotions as primarily a human phenomenon, thus hampering any reconciliation with the view that emotion is at least at some level grounded in nature (with reference to biology and evolution).  One could say fear of death, at least, escapes this criticism because it is generally accepted that only human persons are aware of their mortality and therefore, presumably, we alone are capable of fearing death.  This in turn appears to make fear of death a candidate for a paradigm contextualist emotion – one which is unique to humans and instilled in them by other humans through the application of paradigm scenarios.  But emotional responses to the prospect of one’s own death do not readily fit into this picture.  As has been widely acknowledged from Epicurus onward, death is not an experiential state and so problems arise with respect to our attitude towards it.  There is, for instance, as de Sousa acknowledges, “no target of the fear of death; no experience about which we can ask whether it has a motivating aspect fitting the formal object of fear”.  This absence of a formal object seems to leave an intolerable gap in any paradigm scenario we might otherwise posit as the template for emotional responses to the prospect of our death. 
Yet fear of death is, as de Sousa notes in a recent paper, readily classifiable as “the paradigm of all aversion”.  It hence stands at the pinnacle of one of the most commonly-experienced type of emotions, and so, it seems, it would demand that we fit it into whatever general theory of the emotions we might advocate.  I will ask, in this paper, how we come to have the emotional responses we do to our death.  I examine and reject arguments against the possibility that their origins are in some way natural/biological.  This then puts pressure on the demand for a contextualist-type explanation.  But, I argue, talk of paradigm scenarios does not provide sufficient explanation of the conceptual origins of our fear of death.  I will then question whether and to what extent we can make sense at all of our emotional responses to death as public social constructs, learned from others.

44. Merits of the concern-based construal theory of emotions
Ayca Boylu
Department of Philosophy
University of Virginia, USA

Perhaps the main motivation that underlies the growing search for the nature of emotions in philosophy is to be able to unmask the various ways in which emotions relate to other philosophically significant phenomena such as desire, action, concern/care/value, morality, rationality, deliberation, belief, knowledge (especially self-knowledge), welfare/well-being, virtue, freedom, weakness of the will, etc. However noble and novel this motivation might be, those philosophers who attempt to provide new and better accounts concerning the nature of emotions must nowadays undertake the challenge of science. According to Paul E. Griffiths for example, the hope of revealing the nature of emotions lies in neurobiology and cognitive science, not only because of the recent findings they yield but also because of a set of objections he puts forward against all those theories of emotions that he groups under ‘propositional attitude theories’. In this paper I attempt to shed light on the merits of the theory that emotions are concern-based construals characterized in depth by Robert Roberts in his book “Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology”. Some of the merits of the theory discussed in this paper are that (1) Roberts’ theory satisfactorily meets Griffiths’ objections and that (2) the theory’s explanatory power stands out in making sense of what it is for someone to realize her freedom of emotions. The plan I pursue in elaborating these merits is as follows: 
I investigate to what extent Roberts’ theory may be taken to be a propositional 
attitude theory. After I lay out the significant elements of his theory, I discuss which elements of his theory might satisfy the “propositional” condition and what might satisfy the “attitude” condition of being a propositional attitude theory. Relying on my investigation, I conclude that some concern-based construals are propositional attitudes in some sense.
Then I proceed to demonstrate how Roberts’ theory can be made use of in replying
to Griffiths’ objections to propositional attitude theories concerning; the discrepancy between having a judgment and having an emotion, the way in which judgments underdetermine emotions, the evaluations that are unemotional, the emotional responses to imagination, and the significance of physiological aspects of emotions.
I draw attention to how Roberts’ theory can explain our, what I shall call ‘implicit
realization of freedom of one’s emotions’ and also ‘explicit realization of freedom of one’s emotions’. I use the former to capture one’s experience of allowing herself to have the emotion she in fact wants to have or she identifies with. This discussion enables me to illuminate why it occurs to us only as an after-thought that we have emotionally changed in accordance with who we want to become. I use the latter expression to capture one’s rather rare experience of creating the emotion she identifies with by feeling a non-owned concern-based construal. This kind of freedom may be appealed to when one has the relevant value judgments and beliefs required for an emotion but lacks the construal. I illustrate both kinds of realizing one’s freedom of emotions by appealing to examples.

45. Psychopharmacology and the psychoevolutionary theory of emotion:
Bridging the gap between affect-programs and system modularity
Jason St. John Oliver Campbell
University of South Florida, Tampa, USA

P.E. Griffiths, in his 1990 article entitled, ‘Modularity, and the Psychoevolutionary Theory of Emotions’, sets out to offer a biological account of the emotions. Fifteen years after the publication of this work, it is evident the Griffiths’ account of the function of affect-programs (or the neural circuitry resulting in six categories of emotional response, viz., sadness, happiness, anger, disgust, fear and surprise) certainly warrants a reinvestigation. The purpose, then, of this essay is to demonstrate the significance of Griffiths’ contribution to psychopharmacology and, more importantly, illustrate the relationship of affect-programs to the “output” of such programs, viz., explicating the relationship between the identification of a given emotion and the dissociability of such emotion pharmacologically. Hence, it will be suggested that following Griffiths’ theory of affect-programs coupled with new data and advances in psychopharmacology, will allow neuropsychologists to identify particular drugs or classes of drugs that will directly facilitate the manifestation and recognition of an emotional state. Griffiths suggests that cognitive states must cause physiological disturbances of some kind if they are to count as an emotion. If this is so, understanding psychopharmacology necessitates an understanding of the affect-programs, and affect-programs are the neural circuitry wherein the modularity of the system triggers the “output”, then to understand the psychopharmacological influence on the modularity of the system is to understand a fuller conception of neural connectivity. To bridge the gap between an understanding of affect-programs on the one hand, and its relation to the modularity of the system (as an “output” trigger) on the other, incorporated into Griffiths’ analysis, will be a discussion of two drugs, viz., 15 mg of diazepam and 80 mg of the oral β-blocker Propranolol, and, finally, the effects that result in a reduction of the amino acid Tryptophan. 
Amidst the discussion of psychopharmacology and system-modulation is an essential, yet often overlooked, investigation of the phenomenology of Otherness. To be clear, in discussing a theory of emotions, it will not be suggested that psychopharmacology (the sciences) and phenomenology (the humanities) are mutually exclusive, as many arguments have reduced an analysis of the emotions to either a physicalist or purely normative account. On the contrary, with respect to an investigational theory of the emotions, phenomenology and psychopharmacology can both facilitate in a fuller understanding of emotions. 
It is within a nexus of interpersonal connections — beginning in our youth — that we come to recognize emotional states. If affect-programs are the neural circuitry wherein the modularity of the system triggers the “output,” and there is a connection between the perception of the Other’s emotional state (occurring naturally), which corresponds to a recognition of the same state induced by drugs (recognition of the emotional state induced pharmacologically), then it is only through an interpersonal and interdisciplinary investigation of emotions that we can link the external recognition of an emotion with the internal psychopharmacological state.

46. Intentionality in Hume's theory of the passions
Åsa Carlson
Department of Philosophy
Stockholm University, Sweden

Hume's theory of the passions is sometimes taken to be a so-called feeling-theory of emotions as opposed to a cognitive theory. Although, anyone who takes her time to read through the second book of Treatise – "Of the Passions" – will find that Hume's passions have objects: intentional objects. A certain kind of passion directs the mind towards a certain kind of object; even though the passion itself, in Hume's theory, is an impression and hence does not represent anything the way his ideas do (ideas represent impressions since they are, Hume tells us, copies of impressions). This turns Hume's theory into an interesting example of a theory which makes of the emotions something in-between mere or "raw" feelings, i.e. sensations, and full-blown cognitions, i.e. propositions. The semi-cognitive view is, as we all know, important for Hume who wants to argue that morality is grounded in the passions. The problem is how to account for the Humean intentionality. Hume himself relies on his laws of association and other properties of the human mind – the human nature – in explaining the intentionality, although he never uses this very term. 
That, however, is not fully convincing today. I will look at some interpretations of Hume, focusing on the intentionality of emotions (passions, in his terms), and try to spell out the merits and demerits of them, both in relation to Hume's text and – and foremost – in relation to what we may find plausible today. The interpretations I think of are, first, Donald Davidson's "Hume's Cognitive Theory of Pride", which deliberately turns Hume's passions into judgements of value and hence into propositions, something Hume, as Davidson of course knows, never would have accepted; second, Annette C. Baier's "Hume's Analysis of Pride", which makes of the intentionality a somehow conceptual relation; and, third, Lilli Alanen's "Reflections and Ideas in Hume's Account of the Passions", treating the intentionality as a mental act-content relation. There is, I believe, something useful in each of these three accounts, which I try to bring together. My claim is that Hume was right in many respects though he missed the close connection between the emotional feeling and the emotional expression.

47. Representational emotions represented
Pessi Lyyra
Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences
University of Jyväskylä, Finland

Following Hume, philosophers traditionally hold emotions to constitute a problem to a representational theory of mind. The content of the emotion, a proposition, represents external conditions, but the felt emotion itself is non-representational. Recent forms of representationalism contest this. Drawing on the Jamesian view of emotions, they argue that emotions are bodily perceptions; they represent changes of body associated to emotions. Unfortunately, this view faces two obstacles. First, it cannot explain the survival value that such representations good contribute. Second, cognitive theories of emotions have provided evidence to the view that representations of bodily changes are not sufficient for individuating emotions. Instead, a cognitive component is needed to distinguish emotions with identical bodily perceptions. This leads to a second type of representationalism about emotions, one requiring both representation of the environment and the representation of the body.
More recently, this view has been challenged by Jesse Prinz in Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotions (OUP 2004). Prinz defends an alternative representationalist view of emotions. According to his theory, emotions do not require a cognitive component and often appear without it. Instead of representing only bodily changes, however, Prinz argues that emotions represent – via perception of the body – the relation of the organism to its environment. Emotions represent our relations to objects and states of affairs as significant for our well-being. Cognitive evaluation is unnecessary, since a primitive kind of perception suffices to elicit an emotion. According to the famous example by LeDoux, the visual perception of a snake elicits a fear response before we cognitively recognise the snake as a snake. It is clear that emotions conceived this way contribute to survival. I shall defend Prinz’s representational theory of emotions as the best representational theory of emotions on the market. 
One of the major advantages of a representational theory of emotions is that it allows a plausible account of how we can represent (introspect) our current feelings in addition to just feeling them. In fact, there are different forms of first-order and higher-order representational theories of introspection available to Prinz’s representational theory of emotions. I shall argue that a dispositional higher-order thought theory of emotional introspection provides the most viable alternative. 
There are, however, a couple of requirements a theory of self-awareness has to meet. It has been insisted that a theory of introspection must explain the first-personality of the target mental states for introspection to constitute self-awareness in the first place. Relatedly, the target mental states must be immune to error through misidentification. I shall point out that a Prinz’s theory can readily meet these requirements. Holding emotions to be relations of ourselves to the environment, his theory is an indexical theory of emotions. In other words, emotions always contain at least an implicit reference to oneself. The implicit reference to oneself guarantee the first-person mode of emotions and also the immunity to error through misidentification.

48. Pattern of emotion and excess
On Advantages of Being on the Verge of a Nervous Breakdown
Dina Mendonça
Instituto de Filosofia da Linguagem
Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Portugal

	This paper constructs a pattern of emotion by thinking of emotions in terms of activity and explores the notion of emotional excess in light of such a pattern.
	The first part of the paper presents the pattern of emotional activity. Such a pattern of emotion aims to capture the dynamic nature of emotional life providing a vocabulary to focus our attention in the lively activities of mind instead of its results, and making us understand that the clear and compact words we have for some emotions does not exhaust the thought provoking reality of emotional life (Dewey LW 10:49). The design of the pattern of emotional activity is made in analogy to the Deweyan pattern of inquiry, given the startling conclusion that under Dewey’s description emotions behave like ideas. After an explanation of the pattern of emotional activity, it will be shown how the pattern of emotion allows us to explain some of the mysterious aspects of emotional life (e.g. some of the ambiguities of emotion-words). In addition, the paper argues that such a pattern may provide a unifying tool of research among the different philosophical investigation about emotion, such that this pattern may open the possibility for a Unified Theory of Emotion.
The second part explores the issue of emotional excess. Building upon the pattern of emotional activity, I start by claiming that stories provide an experimental laboratory of emotions and embody a deliberate search of paradigm scenarios (De Sousa 1987, 182) that illustrate the open-ended character of emotional life. De Sousa is right when he states that we become acquainted with the vocabulary of emotion through paradigm scenarios but the story of how these paradigms are constructed is more complex than De Sousa describes them to be. After describing the creative process of constructing these paradigm scenarios, I argue that emotional excess has an irreplaceable role in the construction of paradigm scenarios, similarly to the way it is crucial to study controlled explosions in the laboratory when one studies chemistry. Such analysis will show that the importance of incorporating a positive account of excess in the nature of emotion, for emotional excess may not only teach us our emotional limits but also that certain emotional states do require an intensity that is not negative. 
	I conclude by pointing out some of the things that have been left open and unanswered about the pattern of emotional activity, and finish the paper with some comments of the consequences of adopting a situational approach to emotion. 

Bibliography: 
De Sousa, Ronaldo. The Rationality of Emotion. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987.
Dewey, John. The Early Works, 1882-1898. Edited by Jo Ann Boydston. 5 vols. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969-1972.
. The Middle Works, 1899-1924. Edited by Jo Ann Boydston. 15 vols. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1976-1988.
. The Later Works, 1925-1953. Edited by Jo Ann Boydston. 17 vols. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1988-1991.

49. Knowing through emotions (or: The role of emotions in epistemology)
Bengt Molander
Department of Philosophy
NTNU Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet, Trondheim, Norway

I will briefly argue that human knowledge is not primarily to be understood in terms of representations (of any kind). It is rather to be understood in terms of how human beings go about in the world and how they develop the practices they take part in. The key term in epistemology should not be “knowledge” but the knowing/acting human being, which in turn can be elucidated in terms of “the attentive human being”. On that pragmatist basis I will explore the role and importance of emotions for human knowledge (of various kinds).
	It will be argued that the role of emotions for human knowledge is very context sensitive. Some emotions open up the world for a subject, some close it. Thus there could be no fixed criteria for deciding which emotions are the epistemologically privileged ones.
	The main part of the paper will explore the role of emotions for knowledge in an intersubjective setting. The following words by William James about pragmatism (in Pragmatism) may indicate my general perspective, if “knowledge” is substituted for “truth”: “Her only test of probable truth is what works best in the way of leading us, what fits every part of life best and combines with the collectivity of experience’s demands, nothing being omitted.”

50. True emotions 
Mikko Salmela
Helsinki University, Finland

Introduction
There is a wide agreement among philosophers that emotions are capable of having and lacking epistemic warrant. Most contemporary philosophers refer to this kind of warrant by the notion of appropriateness or fittingness that is taken to be an analog of truth in the emotional domain (e.g. Nussbaum 2001, Goldie 2000, D=Arms & Jacobson 2000; Elster 1999; Greenspan 1988). However, if we allow an analog between appropriateness and truth, why not go all the way and argue that emotions are capable of being true and false? Many theorists appear to be flirting with this idea as they suggest that appropriate emotions Aenable us to get things right@ (Goldie 2004, 99, original italics) by Aproperly tracking those properties [funny, shameful, etc.] of which they purport to be perceptions@ (D=Arms & Jacobson 2000, 69 my italics). After all, such locutions as >getting things right= and >tracking= are usually applied to such discourses where truth predicate is available. Yet only a few philosophers, most notably Ronald de Sousa (2002, 2004), have risen to the challenge to construe a plausible account of emotional truth.

In this paper, I will argue that an adequate understanding of the nature of emotions is compatible with their being truth-apt mental states even if they cannot be reduced to propositional attitudes. I will also suggest that an anti-realist theory of truth provides a plausible model for emotional truth. I start by analysing de Sousa=s view on the nature of emotions and his proposal for the notion of emotional truth which I find promising yet insufficient and sketchy as they stand. The ensuing discussion focuses on the problems of de Sousa=s view together with my elaborations of it.

De Sousa on Emotional Truth
De Sousa (2004) rejects strong cognitivism in the theory of emotion. His basic reason is the evidence on groundless emotions that we may experience in spite of contrary well-founded beliefs. However, de Sousa does not reject cognitivism for he suggests that perception is a form of cognition that is capable of accommodating groundless emotions. The argument is based on an analogy between groundless emotions and visual illusions that may persist in the face of the knowledge that they are illusory. De Sousa admits that emotions differ from sense perceptions by being relatively opaque. Moreover, emotions represent many Aobjects@ at the same time. Emotions often relate to some specific target in the world but also represent the subject=s bodily state that an exteroceptive perception has initiated. Yet de Sousa proposes that the liability of perceptions to assessment in terms of veridicality and illusoriness indicates that they still amount to a kind of cognition.
 	De Sousa argues that emotional truth refers not to semantic satisfaction but to success, which is tied to the correctness of the emotional evaluation. A further distinction can be made between emotions with a propositional object and emotions with a direct object. In the former case, AE(p) is satisfied iff p is true, [while] E(p) is successful if p actually fits E=s formal object@, whereas in the latter case, AE(t) is satisfied iff t exists [but] E(t) is successful if t actually fits E=s formal object.@ (de Sousa 2004, 72). For instance, the formal object of fear is the property of dangerous. A phobic person=s fear of spiders is satisfied if spiders exist but it is not successful if spiders are not dangerous. In contrast, if someone is afraid of monsters, his or her emotion is not satisfied if there are no monsters. Yet it may be successful for monsters could be dangerous if they would exist. Emotional truth is thus a matter of fittingness of the particular emotional object with the relevant formal object.
The next question is how to evaluate the correctness of emotional evaluations. Here de Sousa introduces his axiological hypothesis of emotions as perceptions of value. Values are out there in the world but not independently of our emotional responses but only in virtue of them. De Sousa calls his view >axiological holism= for Ait stipulates that we do not apprehend value in discrete units but only in the light of a complex of factors that transcend individual experience.@ (De Sousa 2002, 255). Among these factors are biological facts, social norms, and >paradigm scenarios= of individual biography. Yet none of them alone constitutes norm for emotional truth. AInstead it is the totality of all these factors Bbiological, social, personal, and moreB that may properly be confronted with one another in the hope of arriving at something like reflective equilibrium.@ (De Sousa 2004, 74).

Emotions as perceptions
The first problem of de Sousa=s view concerns his perceptual view of the emotions. Jesse Prinz (2004) argues that de Sousa=s theory is not perceptual, against its own pretensions. Prinz agrees with de Sousa that there are several parallels between emotion and perception. Both perceptions and emotions are, for example, felt, perspectival, and capable of being hallucinatory. Yet these and other parallels do not amount to more than a metaphorical affinity between emotion and perception because de Sousa=s theory Adoes not implicate activity in a perceptual input system@ (Prinz 2004, 223). Even if perceptions are involved in the recognition of salient similarities between present situations and >paradigm scenarios=, these are just elicitors of emotion while emotions proper boil down to primitive gut reactions. De Sousa=s account seems to allow this kind of interpretation for he admits that emotional perceptions differ from sense perceptions by their high opaqueness and internal, bodily locus. But if this is the case, how can we maintain that emotions nevertheless represent external objects in their content as well?
De Sousa would reply that emotions represent external objects through a formal property that they Bexplicitly or implicitlyB ascribe to the actual object of emotion. True enough, there is an analog between emotions and beliefs. Just as to assert a belief is to present it as true, to experience an emotion is to present it as a justified ascription of the relevant formal property. But this does not entail that all instances of fear represent the property of dangerous in their content any more than beliefs represent their condition of success, the property of truth. For this is just a platitude about belief and emotion, not a substantial claim about their representational content.
Surprisingly, perhaps, a solution is available in Fred Dretske=s theory of mental representation that Prinz applies in the defence of his noncognitive perceptual theory. Dretske argues that the difference between analog and digital representation distinguishes between perceptual and cognitive processes.
Perception is a process by means of which information is delivered within a richer matrix of information (hence in analog form) to the cognitive centers for their selective use.B B It is the successful conversion of information into (appropriate) digital form that constitutes the essence of cognitive activity. B B Until information has been extracted from this sensory structure (digitalization), nothing corresponding to recognition, classification, identification, or judgment has occurred Bnothing, that is, of any conceptual or cognitive content@ (Dretske 1981, 142; 153, original italics). 
I pass from a perceptual to a cognitive state when I recognize the person I see as my wife or identify the wine I taste as a Moselle. The emphasis on conceptuality may give the appearance that digital representation and cognition are strictly human phenomena. However, this is not the case, for internal states of any system that is capable of converting perceptual information into structures with semantic content qualifies as cognitive for Dretske.
Dretske argues that the content of distinct semantic structure types derives Afrom the sort of situation they were developed (or prewired) to represent@ (ibid., 209). Both humans and animals have evolutionarily prepared or learned semantic structures for representing, for instance, dangerous situations, which provide the semantic content of their emotions of fear. Dretske notices the reluctance of some philosophers to assign beliefs, wants and the like states to animals that lack language. Yet he argues that their specialized patterns of response compel us to assign them internal states with a specific semantic content that in cognitive terms can be expressed by concepts. After all, if an internal state functions in a cognitive role, it qualifies as a real cognition.
 	We can now see how emotions qualify as cognitive representations of external objects even if they did not possess a propositional content. Emotions may involve beliefs, thoughts, evaluative judgments, and the like but they need not because the content of emotion does not depend on its inner structure but on its representational and functional properties. Indeed, Prinz aptly emphasizes the wide variety of emotion elicitors that ranges from simple perceptions to conceptually elaborate evaluations. However, something is missing because mere perception does not trigger any output in such informational systems as humans and higher animals. It is not the perception of a snake or a wolf or a fast approaching truck as such that triggers a flight response, characteristic of fear, both in a rabbit and myself but only a recognition, either veridical or erroneous, of the particular object as dangerous Ba perception that the object is dangerous (see Charland 1996). True enough, this recognition is automatic and nonconscious if it takes place in the subcortical structures of the brain. But from an informational point of view, it is still a recognition, and as such a form of cognition, as Robert Solomon (2004, 79) has aptly pointed out. Therefore, an emotion follows only from a digitalized perception that by the very digitalization has turned into a cognitive state as it involves a semantic categorization of the perceptually submitted informational content.
Additional evidence for the view that emotions involve evaluative representations of their actual objects in terms of the relevant formal property comes from empirically informed research of emotion experience. In their article AConsciousness and the Varieties of Emotion Experience: A Theoretical Framework@ (2002), John Lambie and Anthony Marcel argue that previous researchers have payed insufficient attention to world-focused emotion experience, which they characterize as Aawareness of the world (or a portion of the world, such as a person or an animal) under emotional description@ (ibid., 223). Such experiences include Athe experience of frightening tigers, disgusting slugs, [or] offensive people@ (ibid). Lambie and Marcel suggest that those perceptions are records of the primary appraisal that elicited the emotion even if they emerge only in the world- and evaluation-focused second-order emotion experience. Philosophers agree, for they maintain that even if formal properties are ascribed to particular objects in emotion experiences, we can Aspeak more loosely Band more naturallyB as if the formal property were simply a property of the target@, as de Sousa (1987, 122) observes. Peter Goldie concurs as he suggests that AWhen we respond emotionally to things in the environment, we also, as part of the same experience, typically perceive those things as having the emotion-proper property@ (Goldie 2004, 97).

Emotional truth 
The problems with de Sousa=s account of emotional truth are twofold. The first problem is that the truth of an emotion cannot be defined in terms of its success alone. This would mean that my fear of monsters is true as far as they are dangerous whether or not they exist, which is absurd. One must also have good reasons to believe that the propositional content of one=s emotion is true or that the target of one=s emotion exists, and these reasons must be verifiable themselves. For example, my fear that terrorists will attack us is true only if a terrorist attack is dangerous, I have good reasons to believe that such an attack is underway or in preparation, and finally, this belief is true. In general, an emotion is true if and only if its actual object fits the formal object of the relevant emotion type, and there is verifiable evidence that its propositional content is true or that its target exists.
The second problem of de Sousa=s notion of emotional truth is its vagueness. The idea of a wide reflective equilibrium of biological facts, social norms, and individual >paradigm scenarios= remains overly sketchy. Unsurprisingly, de Sousa does not give any example of applying this definition. Moreover, the notion of a reflective equilibrium does not give us any grounds for adjudicating between conflicts between biological, social, and personal factors. Obviously, there cannot be any rigid rules because emotions and situations are so various. However, some cases are even more puzzling than others. Take for instance a believer in voodoo who is paralyzed upon learning that he or she has been cursed in an appropriate voodoo manner. The paralysis is self-inflicted through self-suggestion but the result constitutes a significant harm for the subject anyway. Should we then conclude that fear of a voodoo curse is true for the believer even if it is false for a non-believer for whom a similar curse does not constitute a danger?

Crispin Wright has introduced the property of superassertibility as the truth predicate for aesthetic and moral discourses, among others. He proposes that a statement is superassertible Aif and only if it is, or can be, warranted and some warrant for it would survive arbitrarily close scrutiny of its pedigree and arbitrarily extensive increments to or other forms of improvement of our information@ (Wright 1992, 48). Wright applies superassertibility to comic discourse about what is funny. However, I believe that his discussion is applicable to the emotion of amusement whose formal property is funny and, indirectly, to other emotions as well.
Superassertibility provides a new approach to the fittingness between the actual and formal object of emotion. It suggests that there is an actual fit between the particular object of emotion and its formal object only if the ascription of formal object to an actual object is superassertible, which means that the emotion is warranted by the subject=s presently accessible state of information and would remain justified no matter how that state of information might be enlarged upon or improved. The semantic content and initial warrant of each emotion dates back to the original paradigm scenario of that emotion type. However, this warrant may be cancelled by a critical scrutiny of the paradigm scenario or by the improvement of one=s information as de Sousa points out. A paradigm scenario may, for instance, turn out to be highly idiosynchratic or distorted from a wider social perspective. Yet you cannot alter the paradigm scenario of an emotion without changing the content of its formal object at the same time: their refinement goes hand in hand.
But how wide interpersonal or -cultural convergence can or must superassertibility garner in order to qualify as a plausible notion of truth in the emotional domain? Here we must distinguish between the content of individual emotions and their warrant. Insofar as the constitutive norm for the latter is irreproachability in the light of our sensibility of amusement, fear or anger Bor something like thatB there is the demand for convergence, even if not an actual one. And it appears that many of our emotional sensibilities are communal in the same way as amusement. Indeed, the fact that very idiosynchratic fears, shames, angers, and the like Bsometimes even happinessB are regarded as disordered and treated in psychotherapy strongly suggests that standards of emotional warrant are communal. This is the case even with seemingly eccentric emotions, such as nostalgia. We may feel nostalgic about events that we do not expect others to find nostalgic because objects of nostalgy are so intimately connected to our particular life history. Yet our reasons for nostalgy must be intersubjectively intelligible and plausible for anyone from the relevant community taking our point of view. Otherwise the emotion is neither warranted nor intelligible as the emotion it purports to be.
The relation of emotions and their reasons shows how the notion of superassertibility can be applied to emotions. For emotional perceptions of objects in terms of formal properties cannot be justified by themselves but only by reasons as Goldie (2004) points out. These reasons refer to the lower-level property or properties of the particular object that render it fitting for the emotion type. For instance, an object is dangerous if it is capable of inflicting significant harm to the subject and disposed to do so. But harmful is a thick evaluative concept with a rich descriptive content (see Williams 1985). Even if harm can be inflicted in many different ways, ranging from physical assault to personal bankruptcy and nervous breakdown, the result Band the definitionB of harm is the same: disruption of vital biological, psychological, and/or social functions of the subject. Thus, the property of harmful constitutes the lower-level base on which the formal property of dangerous supervenes.
Supervenience of formal properties on lower-level properties renders ascriptions of the former liable to rational evaluation and criticism. We can ask whether the actual object of emotion possesses a lower-level property or properties that warrant the ascription of a certain formal property to it in a particular community of sensibility, and whether a particular lower-level property warrants the ascription of a distinct formal property in the first place. Since lower-level properties are thick or descriptive, the warrant that they provide for the ascription of formal properties is defeasible in the light of enlarged or improved information. For example, our information about what can significantly harm us may, and indeed does, enlarge and change from time to time, consequently affecting our warranted ascriptions of the property of dangerous. But if such ascription remains warranted no matter how much our information about what is harmful for us would be enlarged or improved, it is true in the sense of being superassertible.
True fears could then include fear of radioactive radiation or tsunamis, but also fear of extended unemployment or nervous breakdown because no further or enlarged information alone, without a social reform, is actually capable of defeating the warrant for the claim that these things are dangerous in the contemporary Western society. This is quite unlike the voodoo case where knowledge about the causal realization of voodoo curse through self-suggestion is capable of removing the danger of being seriously harmed by a curse, even though this may not happen overnight. Yet it is the improved information as such, instead of eradication of voodoo as a social practise, that is capable of removing the danger of the curse and its warrant as an object of fear.

Conclusion
Emotions have a cognitive content that corresponds with the formal object of the relevant emotion-type and functions as the inner cause of emotion that gives rise to its other components. However, an emotion is true if and only if there is an actual fit between the particular object of emotion and its formal object, and there is verifiable evidence that its propositional content is true or that its target exists. Finally, fittingness between the actual and formal object of emotion is based on the former=s lower-level properties whose warrant for the ascription the formal property is superassertible. 

51. Emotions as texts 
Stefán Snævarr
Department of Philosophy
Bergen University, Norway

I want to show that emotions are text-analogues, more precisely discourse-analogues. My inspiration comes from Paul Ricoeur, who says that actions are texts or text-analogues. More precisely he likens them to what he calls "discourses". A discourse is the aspect of the speech event that can be recorded, made into a text. The same holds for actions. One of the reasons that actions are analogous to discourses is that we cannot make full sense of any action unless we recognise that its meaning is distinguishable from its occurrence as a particular event. Despite of this, every genuine action is meaningful only because it is some specific person's doing at some particular moment. Further, discourses are ways of using language and that such a use is to act in certain ways. Ricoeur uses speech act theory in order to clarify the analogy between discourse and action. First, an action has the structure of a locutionary act inasmuch as it has a “propositional content” that we can identify and reidentify. Secondly, action has “illocutionary” characteristics that closely resemble the speech acts in discourse. Each type of action has constitutive “rules”. Analogously, I maintain that emotions are in some important ways like Ricoeurian discourses/actions. The first reason is that a disposition to act or behave in certain ways is integral to at least some very important emotions. Thus being in love is not only feeling in certain ways but also being disposed to behave in certain ways. So if actions are discourses and dispositions to act is a part of emotions then it should not come as a great surprise that emotions have discursive aspects. Secondly, just like discourses and actions, we cannot really understand an emotion unless we recognise that its meaning is distinguishable from its momentary occurrence. The emotion must be subsumable under some general notion of a certain type of emotion. It must be love, hatred, pride etc. A private emotion is as impossible as a private language. Thirdly, just like actions, emotions have the structure of a locutionary act in as much as they have propositional structures, which we can identify and reidentify. My anger is about something and therefore it has a propositional content. In the fourth place, emotions have something akin to constitutive rules. Being in love requires that the emoter is disposed to feel in certain ways towards an object in given circumstances. Further, the emoter must behave in a certain way towards the object in given circumstances. Breaking a host of these rules means that the emoter is not in love, even though he/she thinks he/she is.
 Now, Robert Solomon and Norwegian philosopher Petter Nafstad have (in different ways) pointed out that emotions have illocutionary aspects. I situate their theories in relation with mine. 
 Emotion have by necessity a public side because they can be "read" as text-analogues. The "reading" of a purported lover's behaviour can show that he/she has broken to many of the rules of "the game of love" in order to qualify as a real lover. The textual side of emotions makes them interpersonal.

52. The deceitful-partner case and instrumentally rational emotions
Jussi Suikkanen
Department of Philosophy
Helsinki University, Finland

Department of Philosophy
The University of Reading

In a fairly recent article, Patricia Greenspan provides a detailed analysis of how intentionally triggered emotions can be used as rational means to obtain one’s ends (Greenspan 2000). Emotions, so to speak, belong to the everyday life ‘toolbox’ or ‘survival kit’ of practically rational agents. If emotions can be deliberately used in obtaining one’s ends, then also the instrumental rationality of emotions can be assessed. Thus, emotions no longer are arational brute forces working in us, but something we can ourselves put to work for us. I have no quarrels in general with this account whatsoever. However, I believe that Greenspan drastically fails in her description of her main illustrating example, the case of the deceitful partner.  This may not sound theoretically or philosophically very important, but I still believe it is an issue worth discussing. This is because intimate relationships like marriage, in which love plays a significant role, are such a big part of what is commonly thought to be of intrinsic value in good and satisfying human life. For this reason, this particular example ought to deserve a sound philosophical account. Greenspan fails in giving such an account.
What Greenspan does not notice is that using emotions instrumentally is a self-defeating strategy in this context. Instrumental rationality cannot therefore make emotions and certain other kinds of emotive behaviour rational in these circumstances. This conclusion that something so common as being angry towards a deceiving partner and expressing this anger in behaviour would prove to be irrational may sound alarming. That so many of us would not be “mentally functioning well” would give reason to doubt also our mental health in general (Gert 2004, ch, 1). But besides of being instrumentally rational emotions can also be rational in other ways, as Greenspan herself notices. First, they can be “constitutively” rational, i.e., enable us to feel and act in a way that constitutes us as having certain practical identity, for example, that of a partner in a marriage, or a friend, or a promiser, etc (Greenspan 2000, 477). Second, emotions can be representationally rational, i.e., they can represent certain features of the world in a fitting way, as fear towards certain object can be a correct representation of certain features of a dangerous object (ibid., McDowell 1985). With the help of Greenspan’s ideas and Bennett Helm’s account of rational patterns of emotions we can more than well rationalize anger in the deceitful partner case without the problem of self-efficacy or, at least, this is what I attempt to do in this brief inquiry.

53. The content of basic emotions: A strand in favour of a modest account of emotional experience
Edoardo Zamuner
University of Edinburgh, U.K.

A basic emotion episode is a conscious occurrence in the subject’s mind that is accompanied by an emotional experience. The burden of determining the nature of emotional experience concerns the sort of bodily state that we grant as the content of this experience. To this end, I shall introduce the distinction between a modest and immodest account of emotional experience. 
An account of emotional experience is immodest when it states what can count as content of the emotional experience and what cannot. The main problem with this account is that it credits emotional experience with a very distinctive content, such as a whole bodily state felt from the inside. This seems to be quite counter-intuitive. Most of our emotions have poor phenomenal content. For instance, when we meet a friend and we are glad to see him, it is quite likely that the entire phenomenal content of the experience is just the feeling of pleasure that accompanies our smiling at him. An account of emotional experience is modest when it grants that the phenomenal content of an emotion episode is nothing but what the subject feels. This may be just the pleasant feeling that we feel when we smile at someone. 
My aim is to show that our basic emotions have a sort of content that is fully explained by a modest account. Consider the case of a mother who says to her child “Now, I am angry at you. You have to tidy up your room immediately!” In the act of making her claim, the mother does not feel any emotional experience of the sort entailed by an immodest account. Does this mean the mother has no emotional experience at all and, then, that she is lying? This conclusion is counter-intuitive since her verbal and non-verbal behaviour is consistent with the look that people normally have whey they are angry: she frowns, her tone of voice is loud, and her posture is aggressively leaning towards the child. 
Wittgenstein focuses on the fact that the content of emotional experience is constituted by what the subject feels when he expresses his emotion. In other words, the expression of an emotion episode through non-verbal behaviour is what constitutes the emotional experience. The phenomenal content of the mother’s emotion episode is what she feels in the very act of expressing her emotion. This account has the virtue of accommodating the fact that emotion is accompanied by emotional experience with the fact that some emotions have very poor (modest) phenomenal content. 
A way of explaining why the only things that the angry mother feels are these located feelings is by appeal to Griffiths’s notion of Machiavellian expressions of emotions. Griffiths’s fundamental idea is that emotion expressions are Machiavellian in the sense that they are often meant to affect the person at whom they are directed. This means that someone may express a certain emotion only for the sake of the effect that this will produce in the receiver.